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the shareholders are a useful countervailing force against the self-interested behaviour of 
corporate agents. In the other, shareholders lack the motivation, information, and proper 
incentives to contribute to the good governance of business corporations. Both stories are 
true on occasion, but is one generally more true than the other? Currently, developments in 
corporate and securities law are predicated on the idea that shareholders are, generally, a 
positive force in corporate governance. This seems to be a corollary of agency cost theory, the 
dominant paradigm for understanding the relationships between corporate actors.
This article reviews the body of empirical research on the outcomes of the various forms 
of shareholder activism. Proposals, proxy campaigns, and takeovers represent the most 
impactful and costly forms of shareholder engagement with corporations. As it happens, 
the empirical evidence does tend to strongly support one of the two stories about the role of 
shareholders, but it is not the one currently dominating law reform efforts. If the character 
of shareholder interventions generally supports the story that shareholders lack the proper 
incentives and information to contribute to positive business outcomes, then much about the 
current regulatory scene needs to be re-evaluated.
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THERE ARE TWO STORIES told about shareholders in corporate law. In the first 
story, a manager regularly finds themself in conflicts of interest, directors do 
little to restrain their worst impulses, and shareholders are the only plausible 
countervailing power. In the second story, shareholders lack the opportunities to 
become familiar with the unique circumstances of a company and have incentives 
that often conflict with the company’s long-term interests. The moral of this 
second story is precisely the opposite of the first: Boards must be given protection 
from shareholder power. The competition between these stories undergirds 
most of the current debates in corporate law: the merits of activist shareholders, 
proxy access, say-on-pay, the proper ends of corporate actors, how to maximise 
corporate social responsibility, the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, the value of 
the proxy advisory industry, decision-making in takeovers, and others.
Some of these debates can only be described as interminable.1 Legal scholars 
have become so identified with one or another of these stories about shareholders 
1. See Claire A Hill, “An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate” (2018) 
41 Seattle UL Rev 475 at 476 (arguing these debates will never be resolved because they “are 
complex questions, scarcely amendable to resolution by definitive evidence” and are wrapped 
in each side’s prior socially-constructed identity).
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that they have maintained their position for entire academic careers.2 They have 
witnessed the same frauds, economic shocks, corporate success stories, crises, 
and regulatory initiatives; finding their story vindicated at precisely the time 
their opponents find the opposite. Meanwhile, public policy cannot wait for 
scholarly consensus, and so legislative and regulatory changes reflect largely the 
first of these stories, with little apparent effort to explain why that story has 
been favoured and the merits of the other ignored. This article is an attempt to 
step back from the policy issues of the day and to look at the empirical evidence 
surrounding various forms of shareholder activism, asking what evidence exists 
for either story and whether the direction corporate law has taken over the past 
several decades is correct.
I. THE STORIES
What I am referring to as “stories” are, of course, economic models of shareholder 
behaviour. Like all models of economic behaviour, they leave out a great deal 
about the decision-making process they purport to describe, identifying only 
what the authors believe are the most essential and generalizable elements. 
For example, all the versions of the stories I am describing share the common 
assumption that shareholders, including fund managers, generally act to 
maximise their economic well-being. This is the familiar utility-maximising 
homo economicus from mainstream economic theory. In reality, shareholders are 
motivated by more than just their economic interests. They respond to the pull 
of moral obligations, a desire for self-expression, loyalty towards friends (some of 
whom may be running the companies in which they invest), and dozens of other 
impulses, quirks of personality, and social pressures.3
The measure of the quality of one of the stories I discuss is not, therefore, 
whether it seems to capture the richness and complexity of individual shareholder 
2. See Lucian A Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power” (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 
833; Theodore Mirvis, “Bebchuk’s ‘Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’: An Opposition” 
(15 June 2007), online (blog): Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance 
<corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/06/15/bebchuks-case-for-increasing-shareholder-power-an-
opposition>; Lynn A Stout, “The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control” (2007) 93 Va 
L Rev 789; Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment” 
(2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1735. See also Anita Anand, Shareholder-Driven Corporate 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2019) [Anand, Corporate Governance].
3. I discuss the deviations of shareholder voting from economic self-interest. See Bryce C 
Tingle, “Expressive Voting and Irrational Outcomes in Corporate Elections” [forthcoming in 
2021] [Tingle, “Expressive Voting”].
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decision-making in the way of a novelist. Rather, the merit of the story is its 
usefulness: whether the story accurately describes and predicts shareholder 
behaviour in a range of circumstances across the market, and over prolonged 
periods of time.
I am using the term “stories,” rather than “models,” because the former better 
captures the ways in which these behavioural descriptions are actually used in 
discussions of corporate governance. They function as easily grasped moralizing 
narratives, often lacking the formal completeness we associate with models.4 For 
example, agency cost theory was introduced to the world as a partial equilibrium 
model, complete with crucial, explicit assumptions that made agent loyalty the 
only unsolved problem for the model.5 The existence of these complexities is 
largely ignored in current discussions of corporate governance, however, where 
the agency cost story is understood to be that corporate managers can be 
unreliable stewards of the shareholders’ property, and so shareholder authority and 
monitoring is needed as a disciplining force. It is in its capacity as a story, rather 
than a model, that agency cost theory operates in the background of discussions 
about corporate governance, influencing reform efforts and how certain kinds of 
market behaviour is understood.6 Similar points could be made about the other 
stories discussed in this article (such as the shareholder short-termism story).
A. THE GOOD SHAREHOLDER STORY
Like most debates in corporate law, the good shareholder story begins with Adolf 
Berle. Early in his academic career, Berle urged greater shareholder power as a 
countervailing force against corporate managers, but after witnessing the impact 
of the New Deal’s regulation of finance and imbibing its optimism about neutral 
4. See Kimberly Bates & Dean Hennessy, “Tilting at Windmills or Contested Norms? 
Dissident Proxy Initiatives in Canada” (2010) 18 CG 360 (referring to the way that in 
Canada, what I am referring to as the good shareholder story, “seems to have achieved a 
taken for grantedness, one sign of legitimacy” (ibid at 362)) [Bates & Hennessy, “Tilting at 
Windmills”]. For a recent Canadian example of agency cost theory operating in this way, see 
Anita Anand, “Implications of Shareholder Activism” in PM Vasudev & Susan Watson, eds, 
Global Capital Markets (Edward Elgar, 2017) 17 at 19 (arguing that merely the “possibility” 
that agents may entrench themselves should lead to regulatory and legislative increases in 
shareholder influence) [Anand, “Shareholder Activism”].
5. See William W Bratton & Simone M Sepe, “Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient 
Market Control” (2020) 105 Cornell L Rev 675 (discussing variables left out of Jensen 
and Meckling’s model); Kenneth Lehn, “Corporate Governance and Corporate Agility” 
(University of Pittsburgh Finance Group, 2019), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=3485307> 
(noting agility is left out of the model).
6. See the text accompanying notes 8-24, below.
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technocrats, he ended his career as a supporter of managers as a kind of non-state 
civil servant.7 “The shareholders, earlier thrown up…as a countervailing interest, 
dropped out of the governance picture.”8
Over the next few decades, very few academics paid much attention to the 
good shareholder story or to corporate governance generally.9 This began to 
change by the mid-1970s, when Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s “Theory 
of the Firm” influentially recast the field of corporate law as a place where 
principals (the shareholders) sought to reduce the costs imposed on them by their 
agents (directors and officers).10 This proved to be the most potent formulation 
of the good shareholder story and it came to exercise enormous influence over 
academics and regulators.11
At its heart, the good shareholder story sees shareholders as a useful 
countervailing force against unreliable managers. It is the shareholders’ money, 
after all, that the managers may be wasting through excessive compensation, 
perquisites, empire building, or negligence. The most influential advocates of 
this story have pointed out how directors and officers have historically faced 
very little risk of being ousted in the wake of poor corporate performance—that 
shareholder power to replace directors was limited outside of the extreme step 
of launching a hostile takeover.12 The lavish corporate perquisites and inefficient 
conglomerates of the time seemed to be a logical consequence of this excessive 
7. See William Bratton & Michael Wachter, “Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf 
Berle and the ‘Modern Corporation’” (2008) 34 J Corp L 99; William Bratton & Michael 
Wachter, “Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter” 
(2010) 33 Seattle UL Rev 849 [Bratton & Wachter, “Tracking Berle’s Footsteps”].
8. Bratton & Wachter, “Tracking Berle’s Footsteps”, supra note 7 at 863.
9. See Bryce C Tingle, “What is Corporate Governance? Can We Measure it? Can Investment 
Fiduciaries Rely on it?” (2018) 43 Queen’s LJ 223 [Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”].
10. Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305.
11. Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”, supra note 9 (noting “agency theory as described by Jensen 
and Meckling came to supply the theoretical coherence to corporate law that Bayless 
Manning complained was missing” (ibid at 229)). See also Randall S Kroszner & Louis 
Putterman, The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press, 
2009). Kroszner & Putterman observe that over recent decades there is a growing frequency 
of references to the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling: “The years that followed 
have seen those and related works serve as the core of a literature that has deepened in 
institutional detail, branched out into empirical studies, and inspired progress in formal 
analysis” (ibid at 1).
12. See Lucian A Bebchuk & Jesse M Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004) at 43-44.
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managerial power.13 “As the twentieth century drew to a close, senior executives 
were in charge of larger companies than their mid-twentieth century predecessors 
and had greater managerial latitude, meaning that there was more at stake for 
investors than ever before.”14
Influential academic articles advocating greater shareholder power over boards 
and managers began to be published in law journals with titles like “The Value 
of Institutional Investor Monitoring,”15 “Agents Watching Agents: The Promise 
of Institutional Investor Voice,”16 and “The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power.”17 The rise of the independent director in the modern corporate governance 
paradigm was explicitly linked to the goal of giving shareholders more influence 
over board decisions.18 This flood of articles was understood to arise from the 
growth of institutional investors in public markets, which created a new class 
of highly-educated professional fund managers, who were considerably more 
sophisticated than the retail investors they were displacing. The large holdings of 
institutional investors were also seen as providing incentives for those managers 
to actively engage in corporate governance rather than simply selling shares in 
poorly run companies, like previous generations of investors.19 In Canada, a law 
review article published in 1996 “found a statistically significant correlation 
between institutional ownership and both return on assets and return on equity,” 
13. See Peter G Klein, “Were the Acquisitive Conglomerates Inefficient?” (2001) 32 RAND J 
Econ 745 at 747. See also Paul Boselie & Bas Koene, “Private Equity and Human Resource 
Management: ‘Barbarians at the Gate!’ HR’s Wake-up Call?” (2010) 63 Hum Rel 1297.
14. Brian Cheffins, “The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis” 
(2015) 16 Theor Inq L 1 at 6 [Cheffins, “Corporate Governance Movement”].
15. Bernard S Black, (1992) 39 UCLA L Rev 895.
16. Bernard S Black, (1992) 39 UCLA L Rev 811.
17. Bebchuk, supra note 2. See also Bernard S Black, “Institutional Investors and Corporate 
Governance: The Case for Institutional Voice” (1992) 5 J Applied Corp Fin 19; Mark J Roe, 
“A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance” (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 10.
18. Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, “Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors” (1991) 43 Stan L Rev 863. See also John C Coffee, “Liquidity Versus 
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor” (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 1277.
19. Joseph A McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T Starks, “Behind the Scenes: The 
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors” (2016) 71 J Fin 2905 (while 
institutional investors hold that exit, or threat of exit, is a viable strategy, less than half 
would do so “because of dissatisfaction with performance (governance).” (ibid 2906-07) 
Intervention tactics in governance are a preferred first step, and the threat of exit serves as 
“complement to voice rather than a substitute” (ibid at 2907)).
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which was explicitly linked by its author to the value of institutional investors as 
monitors of management.20
The excitement around the good shareholder story never went away, but 
within a few years, it had moderated.21 Reflecting, for example, on Bernard 
Black’s seminal article, “Agents Watching Agents,” Sharon Hannes observed 
that the paper’s predictions “did not fully materialize.”22 Nevertheless, the story 
remains a potent force in the legal academy.23 For example, in the most influential 
economics book of the new century, Thomas Piketty makes use of it in discussing 
how managers extract rents from shareholders.24 One of the most recent works by 
a Canadian legal academic is titled, “Shareholder-Driven Corporate Governance,” 
and argues that, “[i]n light of this sophistication [of institutional shareholders] 
and the meaningful input that shareholders can provide, it makes sense to allow 
shareholders greater scope for participation in the affairs of the corporation.”25
B. THE BAD SHAREHOLDER STORY
The bad shareholder story arose a little later than the good shareholder story 
in the context of the unprecedented wave of hostile, leveraged takeovers in the 
1980s.26 These tended to be very good for shareholders (at least those who were 
selling into the bid), but bad for a wide range of other constituencies. It was also 
an environment that brought the question of shareholder power into direct focus. 
20. Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada” 
(1996) 26 Can Bus LJ 145 at 179.
21. See Bernard S Black, “Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United 
States” in Peter Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 
(Macmillan Reference, 1998) vol 3 at 459 (finding institutional shareholders spent a trivial 
amount of money on corporate governance and exercised few of the powers provided to 
them by corporate law). See also John C Coffee, “The SEC and the Institutional Investor: 
A Half-Time Report” (1994) 15 Cardozo L Rev 837.
22. “Super Hedge Fund” (2015) 40 Del J Corp L 163 at 172. See also Ben W Heineman & 
Stephen Davis, “Are Institutional Investors Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” 
(October 2011), online (pdf ): Committee for Economic Development <www.ced.org/pdf/
Are-Institutional-Investors-Part-of-the-Problem-or-Part-of-the-Solution.pdf>.
23. See e.g. George Dent, “Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director 
Primacy Models of Corporate Governance” (2008) 44 Hous L Rev 1213 at 1232; Steven A 
Ramirez, “The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance 
Law” (2007) 32 Del J Corp L 345 at 370.
24. Capital in the Twenty-First Century, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2014).
25. Anand, Corporate Governance, supra note 2 at 5.
26. See Diana L Fortier, “Hostile Takeovers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1989) 13 
Econ Persp 2 at 3.
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Should directors have the power to prevent a bid that was supported (as they 
nearly always were) by the firm’s shareholders?27
As it evolved, three distinct versions of the bad shareholder story came to 
be used by legal academics and other interested parties. The first focuses on 
the relative ignorance of shareholders in public markets. Shareholders lack the 
information necessary to make informed decisions about the firm, as much of this 
information is not public, and to collect it would require time and other resources 
that shareholders are unwilling to spend.28 Shareholders entrust their capital to 
agents for a reason. In practice, it is easier for shareholders, even institutional 
investors, to simply exit the stock than to expend the resources necessary to engage 
in collective action.29 In fact, fund managers are largely incentivised to improve 
their portfolios’ relative, not absolute, performance, so institutional investors 
deliberately employ investment strategies broadly similar to their competitors. 
There is pressure not to behave in ways, such as embarking on activist corporate 
campaigns, that might make one an outlier.30 These are the familiar “free-riding,” 
“collective action,” and “herding” problems.31
Whatever the merits of the bad shareholder story as a generalised description 
of institutional and retail investors, at least some types of investor—usually 
described as “activist” and often organised as a hedge fund—have created for 
themselves the economic incentives to collect the necessary information to 
27. Ibid.
28. This position is most associated with Professor Stephen M Bainbridge. See Stephen M 
Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 
97 Nw UL Rev 547 [Bainbridge, “Means and Ends”]; Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment” (2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1735; Stephen M 
Bainbridge, “Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections” (2002) 55 
Stan L Rev 791; Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice 
(Oxford University Press, 2009).
29. See Usha Rodrigues, “Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from 
Ownership” (2011) 95 Minn L Rev 1822 at 1830-31; Roberta Romano, “Institutional 
Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the US” in Geoffrey Owen, Tom Kirchmaier & 
Jeremy Grant, eds, Corporate Governance in the US and Europe: Where Are We Now? (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006); Lynne L Dallas, “Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance” (2011) 37 J Corp L 264; Jill E Fisch, “Securities Intermediaries and the 
Separation of Ownership from Control” (2010) 33 Seattle UL Rev 877.
30. See Ronald J Gilson & Jeffrey N Gordon, “The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights” (2013) 113 Colum L Rev 863 at 893 
[Gilson & Gordon, “Agency Costs”].
31. For a good overview of collective action and free-riding problems, see Mancur Olson, The 
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press, 
1965). For a discussion of herding, see Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, “Rational Herding in 
Financial Economics” (1996) 40 Eur Econ Rev 603.
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improve the quality of corporate management. Activist shareholders may be 
unable to make nuanced judgments about the business with the information 
available to them,32 but they cannot be ruled out on the prima facie grounds of 
a lack of motivation.33
The second version of the story argues that, even if shareholders such as 
activist funds could properly inform themselves, their interests nevertheless 
conflict with those of the corporation.34 Nearly all institutional investors compete 
for investment capital on the basis of their relative returns. Even an index fund, 
which does not actively pick stocks, will lose investors if it suffers too many 
quarters where it underperforms other funds. They are forced to compete with 
“[a]ctively managed mutual funds [which] attempt to beat the market by investing 
in stocks that appreciate faster than average.”35 Thus, while the beneficial owners 
of financial funds (such as pension holders) may be investing for the long term, 
the fund managers themselves are very conscious of the need to consistently 
perform well in the short-run.36
32. See Stephen M Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) (noting “shareholders lack incentives to gather the information necessary to 
actively participate in decision making” (ibid at 238)) [Bainbridge, Corporate Governance].
33. See Alon Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance” 
(2008) 63 J Fin 1729 (noting “hedge funds are more flexible, incentivized, and independent 
than internal monitors, and they can generate multiple gains from targeting several 
companies on similar issues” (ibid at 1733)) [Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”].
34. See Iman Anabtawi, “Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power” (2006) 53 
UCLA L Rev 561 at 577-93; Kent Greenfield, “The Third Way” (2014) 37 Seattle UL 
Rev 749 at 750.
35. Rodrigues, supra note 29 at 1830.
36. For the most exhaustive treatment of these incentives, see Roger M Barker & Iris HY Chiu, 
Corporate Governance and Investment Management: The Promises and Limitations of the New 
Financial Economy (Edward Elgar, 2017) at 32-36 (“Making the Realisation of Investment 
Returns in a Business and Profit-Oriented Activity” specifically details short-term pressures 
impacting different types of investment funds); Martin Lipton & Stephen A Rosenblum, “A 
New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors” (1991) 58 
U Chicago L Rev 187; Jack B Jacobs, “‘Patient Capital’: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help 
Revive it?” (2011) 68 Wash & Lee L Rev 1645 (noting “institutional investors are managed 
by persons or firms whose compensation depends on generating short-term returns from 
the portfolio company shares under fund management” (ibid at 1650)); Dallas, supra note 
29 at 272; Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and 
Firms” (1990) 80 Am Econ Rev 148 (noting “[b]oth fundamental and noise trader risk are 
more important for assets where the elimination of underpricing takes longer, since there is 
more time for bad news or a wave of pessimism to hit. These risks raise the cost of arbitraging 
long-term assets relative to short-term assets” (ibid at 151)).
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In the 1950s, the average holding period for a share traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was about seven years—now, it is about six months.37 
Mutual funds claim an annual turnover of about 100 per cent,38 but a 2010 study 
by the Investor Responsibility Research Institute found that “nearly two-thirds of 
portfolio managers have higher annual portfolio turnover than claimed, some by 
as much as 200 per cent.”39 Hedge funds trade at even faster rates.40 It should be 
noted that shareholders are able to get out of company shares much faster than 
corporate managers who face black-out periods, powerful norms against insider 
sales, insider trading rules, and vesting and escrow provisions.
It follows from the short-term pressures on fund managers that they are 
quick to trade out of underperforming stocks, which (it is claimed) in turn 
puts pressure on corporate managers to sacrifice long-term value creation to 
burnish current operating metrics.41 This usually takes the form of earnings 
management. While occasionally this can shade into fraud (like Enron),42 it more 
commonly consists of real-world expense and investment decisions designed to 
improve short-term corporate performance. This can alter “the timing and scale 
of real activities such as production, sales, investment, and financing activities 
throughout the accounting period in such a way that a specific earnings target 
can be met.”43 Long-term research and development (R&D) investments are 
37. See Justin Fox & Jay W Lorsch, “What Good Are Shareholders?” (2012) 90 Harv 
Bus Rev 48 at 51.
38. See Jacobs, supra note 36 at 1651; James Hawley, Keith Johnson & Ed Waitzer, “Reclaiming 
Fiduciary Duty Balance” (2011) 4 Rotman Intl J Pension Mgmt 4.
39. Ibid at 5.
40. Hennessee Group LLC, Press Release, “Hennessee Releases 10th Annual Hedge 
Fund Manager Survey” (2004), online: <www.hennesseegroup.com/releases/
release20040802.html>.
41. Ibid; Rodrigues, supra note 29 at 1829.
42. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and 
Scandalous Fall of Enron (Portfolio, 2013)
43. Jeong-Bon Kim & Byungcherl Charlie Sohn, “Real versus Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management and Implied Cost of Equity Capital” (Paper delivered at the Annual 
Conference of Canadian Academic Accounting Association, 26 May 2011) at 2, online: 
<www.ssrn.com/abstract=1297938>. See also William W Bratton & Michael L Wachter, 
“The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment” (2010) 158 U Pa L Rev 653 (noting “[o]
nce management prioritizes meeting the market’s EPS expectations, investments that 
enhance long-term value but impair near-term earnings may be delayed or forgone” (ibid 
at 702)) [Bratton & Wachter, “Shareholder Empowerment”]; Thomas Lee Hazen, “The 
Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities 
Market Regulation and Corporate Law” (1991) 70 NCL Rev 137. This view, of course, 
runs contrary to strong versions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, but empirical evidence 
suggests markets are less efficient than strong versions of the theory predict. See Stephen 
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often alleged to be particularly vulnerable.44 Companies with a large percentage 
of high-turnover shareholders have overpaid for acquisitions, sold themselves at a 
discount in mergers, and generally underperformed the market.45
Another possible conflict of interest arises from the character of investment 
funds as diversified portfolios of stocks. Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
predominates as the investment strategy of most categories of institutional 
shareholders and is predicated on the notion that individual firm characteristics, 
such as their corporate governance arrangements, effectively cancel themselves 
out so that the portfolio as a whole reflects only market-wide or systemic risk.46 
As described by Professor Stephen Bainbridge, “Diversification eliminates 
unsystemic risk, because things tend to come out in the wash. One firm’s plant 
burns down, but another hits oil.”47 Indeed, one of the arguments deployed to 
persuade investors to invest through institutional funds, rather than directly, 
is that these funds can provide a level of diversification impossible for the 
average investor.48
Even if we are only prepared to accept a relatively weak version of MPT, 
a representative fund manager will nevertheless be much more interested in the 
risk-taking reflected across their portfolio as a whole than in the risk-taking in 
F LeRoy, “Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales” (1989) 27 J Econ Literature 1583 
(noting “[i]f price always equals fundamental value, then no profit can be earned by trading 
on a discrepancy between the two” (ibid at 1593)).
44. See Joern H Block, “R&D Investments in Family and Founder Firms: An Agency 
Perspective” (2012) 27 J Bus Venturing 248 at 249. Long-term investments in R&D 
may lead to an agency problem between the owners and the managers of a firm, as R&D 
spending and productivity change as new management follows investment capital.
45. See José‐Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, “Shareholder Investment Horizons 
and the Market for Corporate Control” (2005) 76 J Fin Econ 135 (noting “firms with higher 
investor turnover have a significantly higher chance of receiving an offer,” and short-term 
investors indicate “easier targets with lower bargaining power” (ibid at 149)).
46. See Gilson & Gordon, “Agency Costs”, supra note 30 at 867 (referencing the “intellectual 
triumph of modern portfolio theory, which promotes diversification as the touchstone 
investment strategy” (ibid)). See also Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”, supra note 9 at 258; 
Ronald J Gilson & Bernard S Black, (Some of ) The Essentials of Finance and Investment 
(Foundation Press, 1993) at 95-97.
47. Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”, supra note 9 at 258.
48. See e.g. Ulrich Lossen, Portfolio Strategies of Private Equity Firms: Theory and Evidence 
(Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2007).
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a specific firm.49 In theory, it is in the fund’s interests for all of its portfolio 
companies to embark on risky strategies, as this should increase the returns of 
the portfolio as a whole, regardless of what this might mean for those portfolio 
companies whose bets do not pay off. For example, research on bank performance 
in the run-up to the financial crisis suggests that the more power institutional 
shareholders had over banks, the more likely the banks would have outsized 
profits before the crisis and larger losses during the crisis.50 In contrast, banks 
more firmly under the control of their managers took fewer risks.
In the area of corporate governance, firm-specific investigation and activism 
are least likely to be undertaken by the managers of a diversified portfolio, as all 
of the costs will be borne by the fund (driving down its returns), but most of the 
gains will be limited by the fact of diversification.51 Indeed, most of the gains 
will be reflected in the performance of the competitors or the benchmarks that 
the fund measures itself against. In any event, corporate governance failures 
(and successes) are exactly the kind of firm-specific outcomes that a properly 
diversified portfolio is intended to render irrelevant.
Institutional shareholders have interests other than maximizing corporate 
value. This final version of the conflict of interest story observes that fund managers 
may feel they must demonstrate a proper commitment to certain political 
positions about carbon emissions, tobacco and alcohol, defense contractors, 
employment practices, and populist positions on executive compensation in 
order to please the constituencies (i.e., politicians, labour executives, universities, 
politically-motivated individuals, et cetera) that retain them to manage their 
49. Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”, supra note 9. I observe that 
even if a fund is well-diversified…corporate governance measures [as advocated by MPT] 
fail to predict investment outcomes, but viewed from the perspective of the entire portfolio, 
maybe this does not matter—the failures of the various indices might cancel each other out 
(ibid at 256-257).
50. See Nadia Saghi-Zedek & Amine Tarazi, “Excess Control Rights, Financial Crisis and Bank 
Profitability and Risk” (2015) 55 J Banking & Fin 361 at 371; Reint Gropp & Matthias 
Köhler, “Bank Owners or Bank Managers: Who is Keen on Risk? Evidence from the 
Financial Crisis” (Discussion Paper No 10-013, 2010), online (pdf ): ZEW <ub-madoc.bib.
uni-mannheim.de/2907/1/dp10013.pdf>. See also Alan Dignam, “The Future of Shareholder 
Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis” (2013) 36 Seattle UL Rev 639 at 643-58.
51. See Ronald J Gilson & Jeffrey N Gordon, “Agency Capitalism: Further Implications 
of Equity Intermediation” in Jennifer G Hill & Randall S Thomas, eds, Research 
Handbook on Shareholder Power (Edward Elgar, 2015) 32 at 40-46 [Gilson & Gordon, 
“Agency Capitalism”].
TINGLE,  TWO STORIES ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS 69
money.52 Hedge funds may use recondite hedging strategies to profit from declines 
in the share value of companies they target (so-called empty voting) or to profit 
just from movements in the share price, regardless of its long-term direction.53
It may also be in shareholders’ interests to receive money in the form 
of stock buy-backs or dividends, even if this leads to weaker companies, less 
capital for investment, and prejudices the holders of fixed claims such as debt 
holders and employees. The most arresting development over the last fifty years 
is that, since 1962, American stockholders have withdrawn more money from 
corporations than they have invested.54 As a result, corporate-retained earnings 
have declined from an average of approximately 50 to 60 per cent each year to 
three per cent between 1962 and 2002.55 Long-term debt increased significantly 
as well. From 2002 to 2012, net issuance of corporate equity in the United States 
was negative $287 billion—and this includes the frantic equity fundraising of 
financial institutions during the financial crisis.56 As one scholar notes, “[t]here is 
little question that public equity largely has disappeared as a significant form of 
permanent capital.”57
The final version of the bad shareholder story argues that, even if shareholders 
were incentivised and able to collect the necessary information, and even if their 
interests were always aligned with the long-term interests of the corporation, 
52. See Roberta Romano, “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered” (1993) 93 Colum L Rev 795 at 803; Bainbridge, Corporate Governance, supra 
note 32 (noting “[p]ublic employee pension funds are vulnerable to being used as a vehicle 
for advancing political/social goals unrelated to shareholder interests generally”(ibid at 247)); 
Marleen O’Connor, “Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure” (2000) 
22 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 97 at 114.
53. See Henry TC Hu & Bernard S Black, “The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership” (2006) 79 S Cal L Rev 811; Marcel Kahan & Edward B Rock, 
“Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control” (2007) 155 U Pa L 
Rev 1021. See generally Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, “Encumbered Shares” (2005) 
2005 U Ill L Rev 775 at 781-82. For real-world instances, see e.g. High River Limited 
Partnership v Mylan Laboratories Inc, 353 F Supp (2d) 487 (Pa Dist Ct 2005) (this case 
was voluntarily dismissed); BCE Inc, “BCE shareholders approve acquisition by Teachers’, 
Providence Equity and Madison Dearborn” (21 September 2007), online: Starkville 
Daily News <business.starkvilledailynews.com/starkvilledailynews/news/read/3255622/
bce_shareholders_approve_acquisition_by_teachers’>.
54. See Lawrence E Mitchell, “Whose Capital; What Gains?” (July 2012) at 2, online (pdf ): 
Brookings <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Whose-Capital-What-Gains.
pdf>; William Lazonick, “Profits without Prosperity: Stock Buybacks Manipulate the Market 
and Leave Most Americans Worse Off” (2014) 92 Harv Bus Rev 46.
55. Ibid.
56. Fox & Lorsch, supra note 37 at 50.
57. Mitchell, supra note 54 at 3.
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it is just not efficient to run a business by way of shareholder democracy. 
As Chancellor Strine notes:58
it might be…counterproductive for investors to turn the corporate governance 
process into a constant Model U.N. where managers are repeatedly distracted 
by referenda on a variety of topics proposed by investors with trifling stakes. 
Giving managers some breathing space to do their primary job of developing and 
implementing profitable business plans would seem to be of great value to most 
ordinary investors.
Corporate law centralises corporate decision-making in the board of directors 
(which, in turn, centralises it further in the office of the CEO). To do this, 
it provides the board with considerable discretion, which in turn requires limiting 
shareholder power.59
C.  THE TWO STORIES CONSIDERED
Both stories about shareholders are obviously true at least some of the time. There 
are imperial CEOs, negligent boards, and crusading shareholders, just as there 
are uninformed, but opinionated and self-interested, institutional investors. The 
question is which of the two stories forms a better basis for policy? Which of the 
two stories is true most often?
The two stories are not directly relevant to the well-trodden question of 
whether it is shareholders’ or stakeholders’ interests that should be reflected in 
the decisions of corporate agents. Rather, the stories are concerned only with 
how decision-making power is allocated within the corporation.60 I have argued 
elsewhere that the stakeholder/shareholder debate over the content of fiduciary 
duties is of little practical importance.61 Even in Canada, where the Supreme 
Court has definitively resolved the debate in favour of stakeholders, there can be 
58. Leo E Strine, “Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law” (2014) 114 Colum L Rev 449 at 475 
[Strine, “Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors?”].
59. For this argument, see Bainbridge, “Means and Ends”, supra note 28; Stephen M Bainbridge, 
“The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights” (2006) 53 UCLA L Rev 601; Jennifer 
Arlen & Eric Talley, “Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice” (2003) 
152 U Pa L Rev 577; Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, “A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law” (1999) 85 Va L Rev 247.
60. For a recent discussion of this distinction, see David Millon, “Radical Shareholder Primacy” 
(2013) 10 U St Thomas LJ 1013.
61. Bryce C Tingle & Eldon Spackman, “Do Corporate Fiduciary Duties Matter?” (2019) 4 
Annals Corp Governance 272 [Tingle, “Fiduciary Duty”]. See also Michael C Jensen, “Value 
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function” (2010) 22 J 
Applied Corp Fin 32 at 40.
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no objection to permitting shareholders a leading role in corporate governance, 
provided that doing so maximises the welfare of corporate stakeholders as a whole.62
II. THE IMPACT OF THE TWO STORIES
The good shareholder story has always dominated the legal academy. There was 
an eruption of articles in the early 1990s using the good shareholder story as a 
framework to call for greater shareholder power in corporate governance.63 Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s influential 2001 article, “The End of History 
for Corporate Law,” essentially declared that the privileged position that scholars 
gave shareholders in corporate governance was now the only view occupying the 
field.64 While there have been dissenting voices pointing out the faddishness of 
corporate law scholarship in this regard,65 the good shareholder story (in the form 
of agency cost theory) is “the dominant framework of analysis for corporate law 
and corporate governance today.”66
62. See BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at paras 37, 42 [BCE v Debentureholders].
63. See text accompanying notes 11-16, above. See also Annette B Poulson, “Strong Managers, 
Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance by Mark J Roe” (1995) 
50 J Fin 764; Bernard S Black, “Shareholder Passivity Reexamined” (1990) 89 Mich L Rev 
520; Edward B Rock, “The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism” (1991) 79 Geo LJ 445; Romano, supra note 52; Robert D Rosenbaum, 
“Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for Proxy Rule 
Changes” (1991) 17 J Corp L 163.
64. (2001) 89 Geo LJ 439. The privileged position widely afforded to shareholders is referred 
to as the “shareholder-oriented model” or “standard model,” with the author noting that 
“this consensus on the appropriate conduct of corporate affairs is also a consensus as to the 
appropriate content of corporate law, and it is likely to have profound effects on the structure 
of that law” (ibid at 441). In Canada, Anita Anand has written a series of articles supporting 
“a new concept of governance” called “Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance.” See 
e.g. Anita Indira Anand, “Shareholder-Driven Corporate Governance and its Necessary 
Limitations: An Analysis of Wolf Packs” (2019) 99 BUL Rev 1515 at 1518.
65. See e.g. Douglas M Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect of ‘Global’ Convergence in 
Corporate Governance” (2001) 34 Cornell Intl LJ 322 (criticizing those “scholars [who] 
wrote about, and subsequently oversold, institutional investor activism” (ibid at 322)).
66. Michael Klausner, “Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance” (2013) 65 Stan L 
Rev 1325 at 1326 [Klausner, “Fact and Fiction”]. See also Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, 
“Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance” (2017) 117 Colum 
L Rev 767 (noting “the subject of most corporate law scholarship is the conflict of interests 
between managers…and shareholders. Scholars almost invariably conceptualize this conflict 
in terms of agency costs” (ibid at 775)); Boris Durisin & Fulvio Puzone, “Maturation of 
Corporate Governance Research, 1993-2007: An Assessment” (2009) 17 CG 266 (noting 
that, after conducting an extensive literature review, “[c]orporate governance theorizing is 
dominated by the agency approach. The results of our study clearly provide evidence both 
based on the citation as well as the co‐citation analysis. The most influential works are 
proponents of agency theorizing and their influence increases over time” (ibid at 274)).
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The legal regime swiftly followed the scholarly consensus. As one professor 
noted, “[t]he hope of reducing agency costs through institutional activism 
has led to regulatory and structural changes to increase shareholder power.”67 
Another professor noted that the good shareholder story arose at a time where the 
“politically relevant middle class” came to increasingly depend on the securities 
market to plan for retirement.68 The regulatory emphasis on shareholder 
empowerment was thus an attempt by politicians and regulators to improve 
market returns in the ways suggested by the good shareholder story. “[C]hanges 
in the pension system helped to transform corporate governance into a system 
dominated by the shareholder interest.”69
These changes have not occurred at the level of corporate law, narrowly 
considered. Indeed, even with the recent proposed amendments to the Canada 
Business Corporations Act (CBCA),70 shareholder control rights provided by 
Canadian and American incorporation statutes are still “so weak that they scarcely 
qualify as part of corporate governance.”71 Instead, the increases in shareholder 
power have occurred as a result of securities regulators and other parties 
displacing corporate law.72 These non-governmental third parties include stock 
exchanges, proxy advisors, and a large governance “industry” comprised of media 
67. Fisch, supra note 29 at 884.
68. Martin Gelter, “The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy” (2013) 43 Seton 
Hall L Rev 909 at 910-11.
69. Ibid at 911.
70. Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, 
the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act and the Competition Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, 
c 8, cl 13(1) (assented to 1 May 2018) [Bill C-25]. Proposed amendments to the CBCA 
include majority voting for directors of distributing corporations.
71. Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate” 
(2002) 16 Transnat’l Law 45 at 48. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “A Team Production Theory 
of Canadian Corporate Law” (2006) 44 Alta L Rev 299 (arguing that Canada exceeds the 
United States in conferring primacy on boards of directors); Anand, “Shareholder Activism”, 
supra note 4 at 20.
72. See Sean Vanderpol & Edward J Waitzer, “Addressing the Tension Between Directors’ Duties 
and Shareholder Rights–A Tale of Two Regimes” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 177 (noting 
“[t]he securities commissions have, “[t]hrough their willingness to use their ill-defined public 
interest jurisdiction to intervene in corporate transactions…displaced corporate law and its 
focus on the statutory duties of directors”” (ibid at 209)).
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outlets, think tanks, academics, and pressure groups.73 This has happened before. 
As historians of corporate law have pointed out in the context of the separation 
of ownership and control in the early twentieth century, corporate law tends to 
follow, rather than lead, changes in corporate governance practices and norms.74
The recent changes to the CBCA are a case in point. They require that the 
directors of distributing corporations be elected every year (rather than giving 
firms the option of three-year terms), that directors be voted on individually rather 
than as part of a slate, and that a director is only elected if supported by a majority 
of votes cast.75 This means that a director is removable from office, not just when 
beaten by an actual human candidate with a platform of well-thought-out views, 
but through what amounts to a costless recall vote. However, nearly all of these 
rights were already provided to shareholders by the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) in 2014.76 The effect of the CBCA amendments is to remove the last scrap 
of discretion held by the board, under the TSX rules, over whether to accept the 
resignation of a director who fails to meet the majority vote criteria.
The market for corporate control has grown steadily more powerful as 
well—a result of easy financing conditions combined with the decision by 
securities regulators to give ultimate authority to shareholders (rather than boards) 
by prohibiting takeover defenses.77 While never available in Canada, the use of 
staggered (or “classified”) boards in the United States has almost disappeared 
73. See Paul Rose, “The Corporate Governance Industry” (2007) 32 J Corp L 887; Cheffins, 
“Corporate Governance Movement”, supra note 14 at 5, citing “Moves to Halt Another 
Decade of Excess” Financial Times (5 August 1999) at 10. In Canada the corporate 
governance industry includes proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
advocacy organizations such as the Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor 
Rights (FAIR), Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires (MEDAC), the 
Canadian Coalition of Good Governance (CCGG), think tanks such as Queen’s CPA Centre 
for Governance & Accountability, the University of Toronto’s David and Sharon Johnston 
Centre for Corporate Governance Innovation, and media initiatives such as Globe & Mail’s 
annual “Board Games” feature.
74. See e.g. Alessio M Pacces, “How Does Corporate Law Matter? ‘Law and Finance’ and 
Beyond” in Michael Faure & Jan Smits, eds, Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth 
(Intersentia, 2011) at 324. See also Brian R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: 
British Business Transformed (Oxford University Press, 2008).
75. Bill C-25, supra note 70.
76. “TSX Company Manual” (4 June 2020) at Part IV, ss 461.3, 461.4, online: Toronto Stock 
Exchange <qweri.lexum.com/w/tsx/tsxcme-en>. Majority voting policies had already 
been widely adopted on a voluntary basis, but in 2014 they became mandatory for 
all TSX companies.
77. See National Instrument 62-104: Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, 9 May 2016, online (pdf ): 
Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/
ni_20160509_62-104_unofficial-consolidation.pdf>.
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as a result of pressure by activists.78 Poison pills have, for the same reason, also 
been disappearing in that country.79 This has left boards with so little power over 
the sale decision that hostile bids have declined sharply in the era of the good 
shareholder story.80 American boards now, generally, refer the sale decision to 
the shareholders.
Independent directors have come to dominate Canada’s corporate boards 
over the past thirty years.81 While there is no evidence that they improve 
corporate performance (and some evidence that they make it worse for certain 
types of companies), independent directors do give shareholders more power.82 
They have less at stake when a disagreement about strategy arises with a powerful 
investor. Concerned primarily about their reputation—which, in practice, means 
the regard in which they are held by the institutional investor community—
independent directors are less inclined to potentially offend shareholders than 
the insiders who once formed a large part of Canada’s corporate boards.83 
Independent directors are also more vulnerable to investor action, as shareholders 
can vote against directors, but cannot fire executives. The move to create wholly 
independent board committees over remuneration, nomination, governance, sales 
transactions, and financial reporting has magnified this channel of shareholder 
influence. The growth of independent board chairs has done so as well.84
Possibly the most consequential factor in increasing shareholder power is 
the rise of third-party proxy advisory firms like Glass-Lewis and Institutional 
78. See Spencer Stuart Board Index US (2019), online: (pdf ): < www.spencerstuart.com/-/
media/2019/ssbi-2019/us_board_index_2019.pdf> at 15 [SSBI-US].
79. See Guhan Subramanian, “A New Era for Raiders” (2010) 88 Harvard Business 
Rev 34 at 34; Mark D Gerstein et al, “The Resilient Rights Plan: Recent Poison Pill 
Developments and Trends” (July 2014) at 2, online (pdf ): Latham & Walkins <www.
lw.com/thoughtLeadership/2014-poison-pill-developments-and-trends> (using data from 
SharkRepellent.net). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C Coates & Guhan Subramanian, 
“The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to 
Symposium Participants” (2002) 55 Stan L Rev 885.
80. Strine, “Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors?”, supra note 58 at 470-71.
81. SSBI-US supra note 78 (noting that a significant majority (81 per cent) of CSSBI 100 board 
members were independent in 2018, as defined by the Canadian Securities Administrators 
(ibid at 2, 30)).
82. See Bryce C Tingle, “What Do We Really Know About Corporate Governance? A Review 
of the Empirical Research Since 2000” (2017) 59 Can Bus LJ 292 at 296-302 [Tingle, 
“Corporate Governance Empirical Research”].
83. Ibid. See also Fox & Lorsch, supra note 37 (noting “[i]t’s a rare businessperson who relishes a 
contentious election campaign” (ibid at 57)).
84. Tingle, “Corporate Governance Empirical Research” supra note 82.
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Shareholder Services.85 They devote unprecedented resources to corporate 
governance questions, pressure companies to adopt shareholder friendly policies,86 
punish directors for taking certain actions without shareholder approval (even 
when this approval is not required by any regulator),87 and serve as a method 
of coordinating shareholder action by crystallizing significant voting blocks 
around their recommendations.88 Combined with the rise of activist institutional 
investors during the period we are considering,89 proxy advisors have significantly 
increased the influence of shareholder sentiment in the boardroom. Studies have 
shown boards even take actions they believe will be value-destroying to avoid 
violating a proxy advisor’s guidelines90 or to deflect an activist investor’s attention.91
These changes have combined with a shift in the norms in capital markets. The 
good shareholder story is so widely believed that even conscientious directors, who 
have never personally encountered a malfeasant manager, understand their jobs 
to consist primarily of monitoring management and responding to shareholder 
opinion.92 This attitude did not change, even after the Supreme Court adopted 
a stakeholder model of the corporation in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.93
Shareholder power in corporate governance arrangements has also grown 
significantly through informal channels. Surveys suggest that over two-thirds of 
85. See Bryce C Tingle, “The Agency Cost Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms” (2016) 
49 UBC L Rev 725 [Tingle, “Agency Cost Case”]. See also Bryce C Tingle, “Bad Company! 
The Assumptions behind Proxy Advisors’ Voting Recommendations” (2014) 37 Dal LJ 709 
[Tingle, “Bad Company”].
86. See Martin Lipton, “Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2015” (2 December 2014), 
online (blog): Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance <www.corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2014/12/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2015>. ISS’ bias is 
evident, for example, in its recommendation to “withhold/against votes if the board amends 
the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner ‘that materially 
diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders’” (ibid).
87. Tingle, “Bad Company”, supra note 85 at 731-2.
88. Ibid at 745. See also Tingle, “Agency Cost Case”, supra note 85.
89. See Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Hart, 2010) 
chs 1-2. See also Brian R Cheffins & John Armour, “The Past, Present, and Future of 
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds” (2011) 37 J Corp L 51; Anand, “Shareholder 
Activism”, supra note 4.
90. See Kenneth L Altman & James F Burke, Proxy Advisory Firms: The Debate Over Changing 
the Regulatory Framework (The Altman Group, 2011).
91. See Rita D Kosnik, “Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance” 
(1987) 32 Admin Science Q 163. See also B Espen Eckbo, “Valuation Effects of Greenmail 
Prohibitions” (1990) 25 J Fin Quantitative Analysis 491.
92. Tingle, “Bad Company”, supra note 85 at 725-26.
93. BCE v Debentureholders, supra note 62. See also Tingle, “Fiduciary Duty”, supra note 61; 
Carol Liao, “A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance” (2014) 37 Dal LJ 559.
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directors believe activism has resulted in their companies altering their operations 
and capital allocation.94 Activist institutions also regularly persuade boards to take 
strategic steps or accept new directors without any public notice. As a respected 
scholar observes, “since the mid-2000s… management has responded to 
shareholder demands as never before.”95
Academic attempts to score investor protection measures and track their 
change over time find that, “without exception, all countries have increased the 
level of shareholder protection.”96 The most extensive and rigorous attempt to 
measure the growth of shareholder power in the era we are considering finds a 
sharp increase in shareholder power through every channel that Pavlos Masouros 
examines.97 After carefully arguing for the variables he includes in scoring the 
growth of shareholder power, he observes that the “natural” trend of the major 
Western economies “is persistently moving towards shareholder empowerment.”98 
In light of this growing power, Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock argue that CEOs 
are so hedged and second-guessed that they can only be described as “embattled.”99
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT THE STORIES
This article looks at the empirical literature around the three most costly types of 
shareholder interventions in the management of a firm: shareholder proposals, 
activist campaigns, and takeovers. These are all moments when, in contrast with 
passive voting, shareholders take action, placing money and other resources 
behind their governance bets. They thus form the best context in which to 
evaluate the merits of the two stories about shareholders.
The merits of the stories are explicitly tied to the economic outcomes of the 
stories themselves. The good shareholder story we are evaluating, for example, 
94. See Governance Insights Center, “The Swinging Pendulum: Board Governance in the Age 
of Shareholder Empowerment” (October 2016) at 11, 25, online (pdf ): PwC Global <www.
lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/speech/assets_pwc-2016-annual-corporate--directors-
-survey.pdf>. 71% claimed “activism has resulted in companies improving their operations 
and capital allocation” (ibid at 14).
95. Klausner, “Fact and Fiction”, supra note 66 at 1361.
96. Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar & Mathias Siems, “Is There a Relationship Between 
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development?” (2018) 3 JL Fin & 
Acct 115 at 123.
97. Corporate Law and Economic Stagnation: How Shareholder Value and Short-Termism 
Contribute to the Decline of the Western Economies (PhD Dissertation, Leiden University, 
2012) at 215-22.
98. Ibid at 301.
99. “Embattled CEOs” (2010) 88 Tex L Rev 987.
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is not that shareholders care about social and environmental measures that 
managers would just as soon ignore; it is that wealth will be maximised if agency 
costs are controlled. Similarly, the bad shareholder story is not that shareholders 
are only interested in total return regardless of the harm it causes to other 
constituencies. Rather, it argues that shareholder interventions in governance are 
value-destroying. Arguments about the corporate governance arrangements that 
are best for, say, the environment or organised labour, are interesting, but they 
are not the subject of this article.100 Helpfully, the vast majority of empirical 
research over the past few decades on different types of shareholder interventions 
reflects the economic focus of the two stories, usually through examining the 
outcomes of shareholder interventions in terms of share value, executive pay, 
CEO turnover, and various measures of financial operating performance.101
Most of the empirical research on these interventions—and corporate 
governance generally—makes use of US data.102 To take one example of particular 
relevance to this article, Professor Brian Cheffins notes “a lack of Canadian-specific 
data…on the impact that hedge fund activism has on corporate performance and 
shareholder returns.”103 In contrast, as we shall see, there are dozens of good 
studies on this topic in the United States.104 Nearly all of what follows, therefore, 
makes use of empirical studies conducted in American markets.
100. For an example of a recent work on shareholder activism that explicitly ignores (or 
“transcends”) economic consequences, see Lisa M Fairfax, “Social Activism Through 
Shareholder Activism” (2019) 76 Wash & Lee L Rev 1129. See also Aaron A Dhir, 
“Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving 
Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability” (2006) 43 Am Bus LJ 365.
101. See e.g. David Larcker & Brian Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at 
Organizational Choices and their Consequences (Pearson, 2015) (summarizing economic 
research on a range of corporate governance topics).
102. Durisin & Puzone, supra note 66 (finding “most empirical research in the leading academic 
research journals is still done in a US institutional context” (ibid at 279)). See also Angela 
Morgan & Jack Wolf, “Approval of Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals: Evidence from 
Canada” (2007) 16 Intl Rev Fin Analysis 136 (noting “little is known about voting at firms 
incorporated outside of the United States” (ibid at 136)); Shamsud D Chowdhury & Eric 
Zengxiang Wang, “Institutional Activism Types and CEO Compensation: A Time-Series 
Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations” (2009) 35 J Mgmt 5 (noting “[p]revious research 
on CEO compensation has overwhelmingly focused on large U.S. corporations. For many 
countries, including Canada, only limited empirical evidence exists on emerging governing 
mechanisms, such as institutional ownership” (ibid at 7)).
103. “Hedge Fund Activism Canadian Style” (2014) 47 UBC L Rev 1 at 5 [Cheffins, “Hedge 
Fund Activism”].
104. See text accompanying notes 111-23, below.
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Even though most of the academic writing about corporate governance 
appears in the American context, there is nothing about the two stories that is 
unique to that context. At their most basic, the two stories are about economic 
incentives and the resulting behaviour of shareholders and managers. The relevant 
legal rules that give rise to these competing incentives are those that produce 
the separation of ownership and control in the modern widely-held corporation. 
These rules are essentially identical in Canada and the United States.105 Similarly, 
to the extent that the separation of ownership and control in investment funds 
matters for some versions of the bad shareholder story, there are no relevant 
differences in fund structures between the two countries.
The market actors in these two countries are also, in many cases, the same 
people.106 About 30 per cent of TSX-listed companies are also American issuers, 
by reason of cross-listing on a US stock exchange.107 Even Canadian firms that are 
not listed on US markets voluntarily adopt US corporate governance practices, 
either out of a conviction that they are superior, or in order to appeal to prospective 
investors in the deeper capital pools south of the border.108 American shareholders 
are an important constituency in Canadian capital markets, especially in the areas 
we are considering. In one study of sixty-two hedge funds that engaged in activist 
campaigns in Canada, forty-two were based in the United States.109 Tellingly, 
Professor Cheffins’s paper on “Canadian Style” shareholder activism mostly 
describes the campaigns of American-based hedge funds in this country.110
105. See e.g. Bates & Hennessy, “Tilting at Windmills”, supra note 4 (noting “Canada shares 
many features of its governance environment with other members of the Anglo-American 
sphere,” and “[m]any changes in Canadian practices are similar to those in other parts of 
the Anglo-American sphere, and are consistent with the institutionalization of the agency 
problem in other developed countries as well” (ibid at 361)). See also Kimberly A Bates & 
Dean A Hennessy, “Does Convergence in Regulation Lead to Convergence in Practice? The 
Case of Dissident Proxy Contests in Canada” in Abdul A Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa, eds, 
The Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects (Palgrave MacMillan, 2012) 
49 at 50 [Bates & Hennessy, “Convergence”].
106. See Bates & Hennessy, “Tilting at Windmills”, supra note 4 at 361.
107. See Atreya Chakraborty, Lucia Gao & Shahbaz Sheikh, “Corporate Governance and Risk in 
Cross-Listed and Canadian Only Companies” (2019) 57 Mgmt Decision 2740.
108. See Anita Anand, Frank Milne & Lynette D Purda, “Voluntary Adoption of Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms” (29 April 2006), online (pdf ): University of Toronto <tspace.library.
utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/88105/1/Anand%20Voluntary%20Adoption.pdf>.
109. See Dionysia Katelouzou, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Law: An Empirical Analysis Across Twenty-Five Countries (PhD Dissertation, University of 
Cambridge, 2012), [unpublished] [on file with author] at 97-98, 100.
110. Cheffins, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 103.
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A. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Shareholder proposals are the least costly means of shareholder intervention, and 
though they are only advisory in nature, boards tend to implement proposals that 
win the support of a majority of the shareholders.111 For this reason, the proposal 
mechanism has emerged in the last decade or so as a focus of corporate reformers, 
who wish to expand its availability and scope.112
1. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS?
The vast majority of proposals in the United States are made by individuals, 
and they are nearly always the same individuals making the same proposal to 
a wide spectrum of firms.113 In one year, the New York Times reported that just 
three individual investors and their families accounted for over 70 per cent of 
all proposals.114 Canada presents a similar profile with a very small number 
of institutions and individuals making nearly all the shareholder proposals in 
a representative period.115 Among institutional investors, only public pension 
funds and union funds are significant sources of shareholder proposals.116 
Mutual funds are reflective of the for-profit investment industry generally; they 
initiated fewer than 1 per cent of the proposals in a representative proxy season.117 
As Roberta Romano points out, the fact that the sponsors of most proposals 
are not private-sector funds competing for investor dollars, and that they have 
111. See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R Stubben, “Board of Directors’ Responsiveness 
to Shareholders: Evidence form Shareholder Proposals” (2010) 16 J Corp Fin 53.
112. Bebchuk, supra note 2 at 872. For a similar argument in a Canadian context, 
see Jackie Cook & Kevin Thomas, “Canadian Shareholder Proposals Help 
Lead Governance Innovations”, The Globe and Mail (16 August 2017), 
online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/
canadian-shareholder-proposals-help-lead-governance-innovations/article36003708>.
113. See Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, “The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder 
Democracy” (December 2018) European Corporate Governance Institute Finance Working 
Paper No 586/2018 at 12-13, online (pdf ): <www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_
papers/documents/finalgantchevgiannetti.pdf> [Gantchev & Gianetti 2018].
114. See Stephen Davidoff Solomon, “Grappling With the Cost of Corporate Gadflies”, 
The New York Times (19 August 2014), online: <dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/
grappling-with-the-cost-of-corporate-gadflies>.
115. See Jun Yang, Eric Zengxiang Wang & Yunbi An, “Canadian Exceptionalism: Shareholder 
Proposals, Filer Identities, and Voting Outcomes” (2012) 38 Managerial Fin 456 at 463 
(finding 83 per cent of all proposals from institutions are submitted by only five bodies and 
86 per cent of proposals from individuals came from just three individuals).
116. See Gilson & Gordon, “Agency Costs”, supra note 30 at 887-88.
117. Ibid at 887.
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political masters with non-economic interests, is suggestive of “private benefits” 
accruing to the sponsoring institutions.118 Studies find, for example, that “[l]abor 
unions appear to use shareholder proposals to enhance their bargaining position 
during contract negotiations.”119 Other studies find that public pension funds 
and labour funds disproportionately target Republican-leaning firms (measured 
by firms’ campaign contributions).120
According to Proxy Monitor, in the ten-year period prior to 2016, social 
issues made up almost 40 per cent of shareholder proposals.121 Generally, these 
sorts of proposals tend to attract very little support from other shareholders.122 
In contrast, corporate governance-related proposals, in most years the largest 
category of proposal, attract an average of 35.9 per cent support.123 The vast 
majority of these proposals are made by persons unlikely to have the resources 
to analyze dozens of companies, so they “make one-size-fits-all proposals” about 
“corporate governance provisions that they have no experience in evaluating,” 
and that, if adopted, “seem to be ill-conceived.”124 In fact, between 2003 and 
2014, proposals that appeared “generic” (45 per cent), “unfocused” (76 per cent), 
or “faddish” (30 per cent) made up the vast majority of proposals received by 
118. “Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate 
Governance” (2001) 18 Yale J Reg 174 at 231.
119. John G Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, “Opportunistic Proposals by Union 
Shareholders” (2015) University of Southern California Law School Working Paper 
No 177 at 1, online (pdf ): Bepress Legal Repository <law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1313&context=usclwps-lss>.
120. Geeyoung Min & Hye Young You, “Active Firms and Active Shareholders: Corporate 
Political Activity and Shareholder Proposals” (2019) 48 J Leg Stud 81.
121. James R Copland & Margaret M O’Keefe, “Proxy Monitor Report: A Report on Corporate 
Governance and Shareholder Activism” (2016), online: <www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/
pmr_13.aspx> (noting in 2016, half of all proposals included social or policy concerns: “The 
50% of shareholder proposals involving social or policy issues is up from 42% in 2015 and 
39% in the broader 2006-15 period” (ibid)).
122. Min & You, supra note 120 at 109. See also Eugene Soltes, Suraj Srinivasan & Rajesh 
Vijayaraghavan, “What Else do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by 
Firm Management” (2017) Harvard Business School Working Paper No 16-132 at 25, 
online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2771114> (finding in their dataset that “none of the 
contested social/environmental proposals…win approval by shareholders” (ibid)).
123. Min & You, supra note 120 at 108-09.
124. Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, “The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder 
Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism” (August 2020) European Corporate 
Governance Institute Finance Working Paper No 586/2018 at 2, online (pdf ): <ecgi.global/
sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/gantchevgiannettifinal_0.pdf> [Gantchev & 
Giannetti 2020].
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firms in the Standard & Poor’s 1500 index.125 In most years, fewer than 20 per 
cent of shareholder proposals put to the vote attract majority support.126 The few 
studies performed in Canada find that the nature of proposals in this country 
are broadly similar, as is their failure to obtain majority support.127 In fact, the 
average and median voting support for a Canadian shareholder proposal is less 
than half that in the United States.128
Shareholder proposals are aimed at large companies, which makes sense 
since most proposals (whether relating to governance or social issues) are not 
firm-specific but intended to effect a kind of political change (including changing 
market norms).129 Targeting the highest profile firms provides for maximum 
impact. In Canada, one study found that “the majority of the shareholder 
proposals are filed at a few major Canadian banks (almost all other proposals 
also target well-known large Canadian companies).”130 Looking at the relative 
profitability of Canadian targets of shareholder proposals, the authors found 
no connection between stock market performance and proposals: “Canadian 
125. Gantchev & Giannetti 2018, supra note 113 at 37, table 5.
126. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, “2013 Proxy Season Review” (2 July 2013) at 2, online (pdf ): 
<www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2013_Proxy_Season_Review.
pdf> (reporting 44/358, 12.29 per cent in 2013); James R Copland & Margaret M 
O’Keefe, “Proxy Season Preview: Shareholder Activism en Marche” (2017), online: <www.
proxymonitor.org/Forms/pmr_14.aspx> (noting “[i]n 2016, 7% of shareholder proposals 
received majority shareholder support, down from 11% in 2015 but up from 4% 
in 2014” (ibid)).
127. Morgan & Wolf, supra note 102 (while the authors put a great deal of emphasis on the 
fact that there is no evidence of takeover-related proposals in Canada, this is merely a 
consequence of the decision of securities regulators to prohibit defenses that prevent a bid 
from being considered by the shareholders, rather than the result of any cultural or economic 
difference); Yang, Wang & An, supra note 115 (finding similarly few differences in the nature 
and popularity of contested proposals between Canada and the United States). See also 
Evaristus Oshionebo, “Shareholder Proposals and the Passivity of Shareholders in Canada: 
Electronic Forums to the Rescue?” (2012) 37 Queens LJ 623.
128. Yang, Wang & An, supra note 115 at 465. The authors note that more than half of Canadian 
proposals in the sample are withdrawn and, in many cases, this might be because a full or 
partial compromise was reached with managers. About half of these withdrawn proposals 
are on social, ethical, or environmental issues that do not focus on economic outcomes and 
that attract the lowest support in shareholder votes (ibid at 467). Cf Bates & Hennessy, 
“Convergence”, supra note 105 at 52 (finding that only 27 per cent of Canadian proxy 
initiatives are withdrawn following negotiation).
129. See e.g. Fabrizio Ferri & Tatiana Sandino, “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial 
Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing” (2009) 84 
Acct Rev 433; Ertimur, Ferri & Stubben, supra note 111; Gantchev & Giannetti 2018, supra 
note 113 at 14.
130. Yang, Wang & An, supra note 115 at 461.
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shareholder proposals are primarily social activism in nature rather than driven 
by financial interest.”131
2. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE OUTCOMES OF SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS?
While proposals tend to be effective at getting firms to change their governance 
arrangements, particularly those that adversely impact the likelihood of a 
takeover,132 studies of the market reaction to proposals provide no evidence 
that they are widely expected to create economic value.133 In the words of one 
recent study, “the average shareholder proposal generates zero or negative returns 
around the meeting date.”134 In Canada, the one study to examine this question 
discovered “significantly negative returns” around shareholder proposals.135
The usefulness of these sorts of studies is questionable, however. Nearly all of 
them are “event” studies that look at the market reaction to the announcement 
of a shareholder proposal or the news that such a proposal has passed. Virtually 
all of these studies find no discernable evidence of value creation in these 
announcements. The problem is that shareholder proposals are frequently 
announced well before a company sends out its proxy materials and the results 
of the shareholder vote are usually anticipated before the meeting is held.136 
The market will, therefore, have priced in the proposal before the dates used 
131. Ibid at 473.
132. See Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A Kruse & Tom Nohel, “Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover 
Force of Staggered Boards” (2008) 14 J Corp Fin 274; Jie Cai, Jacqueline L Garner & Ralph 
A Walkling, “Electing Directors” (2009) 64 J Fin 2389; Ali C Akyol & Carolyn A Carroll, 
“Removing Poison Pills: A Case of Shareholder Activism” (2006) University of Alabama at 
Tuscaloosa Working Paper [unpublished] [on file with author].
133. See Johnathan M Karpoff, Paul H Malatesta & Ralph A Walkling, “Corporate Governance 
and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence” (1996) 42 J Fin Econ 365; Stuart L 
Gillan & Laura T Starks, “Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The 
Role of Institutional Investors” (2000) 57 J Fin Econ 275; Jie Cai & Ralph A Walkling, 
“Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?” (2011) 46 J Fin & Quantitative Analysis 
299; Gantchev & Giannetti 2018, supra note 113 at 39-40, table 6; Joao Dos Santos 
& Chen Song, “Analysis of the Wealth Effects of Shareholder Proposals” (2008), online 
(pdf ): US Chamber of Commerce <www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/files/
analysis_wealth_effects_volume2.pdf> (finding no short-term or long-term improvements in 
corporate value).
134. Gantchev & Giannetti 2018, supra note 113 at 16.
135. Yang, Wang & An, supra note 115 at 475-76 (this is the same study, referenced earlier, that 
found that “shareholder proposals in Canada are not very value-driven” (ibid at 461)).
136. See Stuart L Gillan & Laura T Starks, “The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United 
States” (2007) 19 J Applied Corp Fin 55.
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by researchers to measure its reaction. As well, both the proxy materials and 
the announcement of the meeting results contain a great deal of information 
besides that relating to the proposal, which likely contaminates any price reaction 
to the proposal.137
Attempts to solve these problems by looking only at “close-call” votes, 
when the market could not reasonably have known whether the proposal would 
pass,138 suffer from significant problems with their internal validity for a variety 
of reasons. The most significant reason is that the studies of this type, performed 
thus far, use a dataset that does not measure voting support using the metric 
outlined in each firm’s corporate charter.139 They therefore mis-measure what 
constitutes a “close-call” vote. Studies looking at “close-call” votes also find 
themselves considering a tiny fraction of shareholder proposals, which makes 
it impossible to extract a general conclusion about the economic effects of this 
form of activism.140
A final problem with event studies is that, in some cases, the proposal is 
entangled with other forms of shareholder activism, such as a hedge fund seeking 
board representation or a raider seeking to open the way to a takeover.141
The problems with event studies (which predominate in the literature) means 
that it is necessary to focus on the longer-term empirical studies. These either look 
at the long-run stock performance of the firms targeted by shareholder proposals 
or examine the actual business performance of the firms, as measured by various 
accounting metrics. A recent review of the seventeen long-run share price studies 
on this topic concluded that, “the available evidence is most consistent with the 
conclusion that shareholder proposals and negotiations are not associated with 
significant long-run stock returns.”142 A similar conclusion may be drawn by 
137. Ibid.
138. See Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, “The Vote is Cast: The Effect of 
Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value” (2012) 67 J of Finance 1943.
139. See Laurent Bach & Daniel Metzger, “How Close are Shareholder Votes?” (2018) Swedish 
House of Finance Research Paper No 17-3, online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2880523> 
(noting “scholars in empirical corporate governance have exploited close votes on shareholder 
proposals in order to identify the impact of governance features, such as poison pills or 
classified boards” (ibid at 27)).
140. See Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, “Corporate Governance and Value: 
Evidence From ‘Close Calls’ on Shareholder Governance Proposals” (2013) 25 J Applied 
Corporate Finance 44 at 50 (finding approximately 88 per cent of a large sample of 
shareholder proposals on governance issues pass or fail by a margin greater than 5 per cent).
141. See Matthew R Denes, Jonathan M Karpoff & Victoria B McWilliams, “Thirty Years of 
Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research” (2017) 44 J Corp Fin 405 at 419.
142. Ibid at 410.
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looking at the shareholder proposal studies that use return on assets, return on 
equity, and return on sales as the key variables. “Most evidence…indicates that 
shareholder proposals and direct negotiations are not associated with increases in 
the target firms’ operating performance.”143
There are only a few studies examining non-financial outcomes, but these 
tend to support the conclusion that shareholder proposals are not particularly 
valuable. For example, three different studies found that companies targeted by 
shareholder proposals and direct shareholder negotiation do not change their 
CEOs at a higher rate.144
3. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN WE DRAW FROM SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS?
The empirical evidence surrounding shareholder proposals can be easily 
summarised: They apparently provide no long-run benefits to the corporation, 
the vast majority appear to be generated for reasons that have little to do with 
improving the long-run financial performance of the company, and they have 
no impact on the most obvious target of the good shareholder story—the CEO. 
There is also evidence that shareholders do not really want their proposals to have 
an impact. Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have pointed out that 
shareholder proposals tend to pursue matters that are minor or irrelevant.145 For 
example, shareholders make proposals to redeem existing poison pills, but avoid 
constraining the board’s ability to adopt a pill in the future, with the result that 
the proposals “have no impact on a company’s ability to resist a hostile bid.”146 
Shareholders also strongly prefer to use precatory proposals, rather than proposals 
to amend the bylaws, which would actually be binding on the company.147
There is very little here to support the good shareholder story and a great deal 
that seems to support the bad shareholder story.
143. Ibid at 411.
144. Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund 
Activism” (1999) 52 J Fin Econ 293; Karpoff, Malatesta & Walkling, supra note 133; 
Michael P Smith, “Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS” 
(1996) 51 J Fin 227.
145. “Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics” (2014) 94 BUL Rev 1997 [Kahan & Rock, 
“Symbolic Governance”].
146. Ibid at 2001.
147. Ibid at 2018-2021 (discussing research that finds “mandatory bylaw amendments of any sort 
are extraordinarily rare” (ibid at 2021)).
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B. ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDER CAMPAIGNS
Activist shareholder campaigns are costlier than launching a shareholder proposal, 
but obviously cheaper than a takeover. They therefore reflect a middle-ground that 
may be a potentially fertile space for investor influence on corporate governance. 
Higher costs discourage uninformed activists while still permitting a wide range 
of institutions to participate.
It is hard to be certain about the scope of shareholder activism. In most years 
since 2006, there have been over one hundred proxy fights launched by activists 
in the United States, but these represent only the last resort for an activist whose 
initial informal approaches have been repudiated by the board.148 The majority of 
activist campaigns do not normally get to the proxy fight stage, but rather result in 
a negotiated resolution.149 If a proxy fight does occur, activists gain some measure 
of victory in over two-thirds of them.150 As a measure of the scope of hedge fund 
activism, it is telling that, in 2017, The Wall Street Journal published, on average, 
more than one article per day mentioning it.151 Academic commentators tend 
to believe Canada’s legal regime is more favourable to activists than that of the 
United States.152
1. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT ACTIVISTS AND THEIR TARGETS
Most, but not all, activist investors are hedge funds, and they usually share the 
same general characteristics as other hedge funds. The managers’ compensation 
148. See Michal Barzuza & Eric L Talley, “Short-Termism and Long-Termism” (2016) Columbia 
Law & Economics Working Paper No 526 at 4, online (pdf ): <scholarship.law.columbia.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2950&context=faculty_scholarship>.
149. See John C Coffee, “The Agency Cost of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted 
Majorities, and the Public Morality” (2017) European Corporate Governance Institute Law 
Working Paper No 373/2017, online (pdf ): <ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/
documents/finalcoffee.pdf> (noting “[i]n reality, there are relatively few shareholder votes 
on activists’ proposals or director nominees. Instead, the activists and management typically 
settle their dispute through private negotiations, with the activist sometimes receiving private 
benefits not available to the other shareholders” (ibid at 2)).
150. Barzuza & Talley, supra note 148.
151. See Ed deHaan, David Larcker & Charles McClure, “Long-Term Economic Consequences 
of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions” (2018) European Corporate Governance Institute 
Finance Working Paper No 577/2018 at 1, online (pdf ): <ecgi.global/sites/default/files/
working_papers/documents/finaldehaanlarckermcclure.pdf>. See also Frank Partnoy, “US 
Hedge Fund Activism” in Jennifer G Hill & Randall S Thomas, eds, Research Handbook on 
Shareholder Power (Edward Elgar, 2015) at 99-100.
152. See e.g. Hugo Margoc, “Shareholder Activism in Canada: A Deliberate Policy Choice” 
(2016) 31 BFLR 291.
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL86
structures are strongly skewed to short-term payoffs. The most comprehensive 
attempt to model the economic incentives of hedge fund managers—direct and 
indirect—found they were strongly sensitive to quarterly performance of the 
fund and that, for young fund managers in particular, the incentives for making 
short-term results at the expense of the long term are “particularly large.”153 For 
“the manager of an average-size mutual fund,” a one per cent increase in the 
return to investors produces “$1,202,000 in expected future compensation.”154 
In contrast to the typical lock-up in a private equity fund that restricts investors 
from getting their money back for five to ten years,155 hedge funds have lock-ups 
that only range from six months to two years.156 This means that hedge funds 
compete for resources on a quarterly basis and that even small improvements 
in the near term produce enormous (one might say, “extraordinary”) financial 
benefits for a manager.
As we would expect given these incentives, studies on activist hedge fund 
investment portfolios find that the median holding period for an investment 
is 12 months by one measure, and 22 months by another.157 Another study 
found that half of activist investments last slightly less than nine months.158 The 
short-term horizon of activist investors does not, of course, tell us anything about 
the quality of their interventions into corporate governance, but it should put 
us on alert. As Chancellor Leo E. Strine notes, “[i]f out of this debate among 
those with short-term perspectives comes optimal policy for human investors 
with far longer time horizons, that happy coincidence would be remarkable.”159 
The simple reality is that activist investors, with a few exceptions, do not bear 
the risks associated with the long-term results of the strategies they impose on 
target companies.
153. Jongha Lim, Berk A Sensoy & Michael S Weisbach, “Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund 
Managers” (2016) 71 J Fin 871 at 901.
154. Ibid at 905.
155. See William W Bratton, “Hedge Funds and Governance Targets” (2007) 95 Geo LJ 1375 at 
1384 [Bratton, “Hedge Funds”].
156. Ibid at 1383-84. See also John C Coffee & Darius Palia, “The Wolf at the Door: The Impact 
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance” (2016) 41 J Corp L 545 at 573.
157. Coffee & Palia, ibid at 567, 572; Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 33 at 1749.
158. Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “‘Activist’ Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? 
What do the Empirical Studies Really Say?” (17 July 2014), online (pdf ): Institut sur la 
gouvernance <www.igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/IGOPP_Article_Template2014_
Activism_EN_v6.pdf> [Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting Wealth?”].
159. “Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund 
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System” (2017) 126 Yale LJ 1870 at 1876 
[Strine, “Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?”].
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One manifestation of this dynamic is that activist shareholders do not target 
companies whose businesses they like, but companies which offer the prospect 
of an intervention that will produce at least a short-term increase in share price. 
These are usually companies with “low market value relative to book value…with 
sound operating cash flows and return on assets.”160 These are not companies that 
are struggling. Indeed, most studies have found that the targets of activists tend 
to be more profitable than control samples.161
The nature of the typical activist target is important because the activist 
playbook is limited. Looking at 1,358 activist engagements between 2000 and 
2010, one team of researchers reported that 35.8 per cent resulted in changes 
to the board (involving the replacement of the CEO, chair, or a non-executive 
director), 21.5 per cent resulted in changes to pay-out policy (increasing or 
implementing a share buyback programme, increasing dividend payments), 
20 per cent involved a restructuring (spinning off non-core assets or blocking a 
diversifying acquisition), and the remainder, 22.7 per cent, ended in a takeover of 
the target firm.162 Most of these outcomes can broadly be described as examples of 
financial engineering. With the exception of board changes (which, themselves, 
are often a precursor to a sale or cash distribution), these outcomes are all ways of 
delivering increased amounts of corporate cash to the shareholders.
There is little evidence that activist interventions involve questions of business 
strategy, operational efficiencies, improvements to top-line performance, the 
development of new products, or calls to increase investments in one aspect or 
another of the business. Even executive compensation, which commonly appears 
as a target of activist campaigns, is not usually impacted. As one group of scholars 
notes, after considering the research on the topic of activists reducing wasteful 
160. Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 33 at 1730; Coffee & Palia, supra 
note 157 at 582.
161. Coffee & Palia, supra note 156 at 582. See also April Klein & Emanuel Zur, “Entrepreneurial 
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors” (2009) 64 J Fin 187 
at 189; Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 33 at 1754; Denes, Karpoff & 
McWilliams, supra note 141 (reviewing the literature as a whole and concluding, target firms 
“tend to have high return on assets” though their equity market performance, below that of 
peers (ibid at 415)); CNV Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S Thomas, “The Second Wave 
of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise” (2016) 40 J 
Corp Fin 296 at 298-99.
162. Yvan Allaire, “The Case For and Against Activist Hedge Funds” (25 May 2015) at 10, online 
(pdf ): Institut sur la gouvernance <www.igopp.org/en/the-case-for-and-against-activist-hedge-
funds-2>. See also Marco Becht et al, “Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International 
Study” (2017) 30 Rev Fin Stud 2933 at 2953, table 6 [Becht et al, “Returns to Hedge 
Fund Activism”].
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expenditures, “the majority [of the empirical studies] do not report evidence of 
changes in real variables consistent with this free cash flow hypothesis.”163
Even supporters of activist investors admit that hedge funds tend to focus 
on corporate finance initiatives, as most hedge fund managers do not have much 
expertise in operational or managerial matters, and they “are not experts in the 
specific business of [the] target firm.”164 There is little attempt to remedy these 
deficiencies. Directors nominated to boards by activists are more than three times 
more likely to be financial services professionals, compared to the independent 
directors appointed by firms in the usual course.165 Studies that have isolated 
activist campaigns in which the activist succeeds in placing directors on the board 
find that target companies experience significant underperformance afterwards, 
unless they are sold.166
2. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE OUTCOMES OF ACTIVIST CAMPAIGNS?
Ultimately what matters is the actual impact of activist investors on target 
companies. Nearly all research to date suggests that the principal effects of an 
activist intervention are: a reduction in investment in capital assets and R&D 
spending; a decline or stagnation in employment levels and wages; a reduction 
163. Coffee & Palia, supra note 156 at 583.
164. Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 33 at 1755.
165. See Andrew Borek, Zachary Friesner & Patrick McGurn, “The Impact of Shareholder 
Activism on Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms” (August 2017), online 
(pdf ): Institutional Shareholder Services <www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/
Activism-and-Board-Refreshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017.pdf>.
166. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 6; Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting 
Wealth?”, supra note 158 at 16; Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, “Investor Activism 
and Takeovers” (2009) 92 J Fin Econ 362; William Bratton, “Hedge Funds and Governance 
Targets: Long-Term Results” (University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics 
Research Paper No 10-17, 2010), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=1677517>; Jonathan 
Macey & Elaine Buckberg, “Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on Efficiency, 
Competitiveness and Capital Formation” (17 August 2009), online (pdf ): National Economic 
Research Associates <www.nera.com/upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf> (noting 
that there are “[s]everal…studies [that] establish that when dissident directors win board 
seats, those firms underperform peers by 19 to 40% over the two years following the proxy 
contest” (ibid at 12)).
TINGLE,  TWO STORIES ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS 89
in the amount of cash held by the corporation; and an increase in leverage.167 
The cash freed up from these changes is returned to shareholders in the form of 
increased dividend payouts or share buybacks.168
These spending changes amount to basic financial manoeuvres designed 
to improve return on assets and equity, which in turn drives share price 
improvements. Earlier studies, in fact, found that return on assets and return 
on equity did improve for targeted firms.169 It is clear, however, that these 
167. See Ian D Gow, Sa-Pyung Sean Shin & Suraj Srinivasan, “Activist Directors: Determinants 
and Consequences” (2014) Harvard Business School Working Paper No 14-120, online 
(pdf ): <www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-120_451759fe-d298-4072-81d1-
b007fd4d5bc0.pdf>; Heqing Zhu, “The Preventive Effect of Hedge Fund Activism” 
(2013), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2369533>; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob 
Kim, “The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor 
Outcomes” (2015) 28 Rev Fin Stud 2723 at 2742 (finding, for example, that plants of 
targeted firms are more likely to be sold); Alon Brav et al, “Shareholder Power and Corporate 
Innovation: Evidence from Hedge Fund Activism” (December 2014), online (pdf ): American 
Economic Association <www.activistinsight.com/research/Shareholder%20Power%20
and%20Corporate%20Innovation%20Evidence%20from%20Hedge%20Fund%20
Activism_150915114423.pdf> (noting that R&D expenditures decline but proxies for 
innovative activity increase); Coffee & Palia, supra note 156 (reviewing the literature and 
concluding, “activist interventions are ‘investment limiting’ in that they increase leverage 
and shareholder payout, while reducing R&D and long-term investment” (ibid at 592)). 
Coffee & Palia also note the evidence in Bebchuk et al showing declines in R&D and 
long-term investment (ibid at 590-91). See Martijn Cremers, Ankur Pareek & Zacharias 
Sautner, “Short-Term Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value” (March 
2017), online (pdf ): European Corporate Governance Institute <ecgi.global/sites/default/
files/2._short-term_investors_2._long-term_investments_and_firm_value.pdf> [Cremers, 
Pareek & Sautner, “Long-Term Value”]; Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “The Game of 
‘Activist’ Hedge Funds: Cui Bono?” (2016) 13 IJDG 279 at 293-94 [Allaire & Dauphin, 
“Cui Bono?”]. See also Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 142 at 412 (setting out the 
results of prior research on capital expenditures, payouts to shareholders, asset divestitures, 
restructurings, and layoffs).
168. Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 33 at 1771; Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, 
supra note 142 at 412, table 2 (showing seven studies, six of which found an increase in 
payout of earnings).
169. Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting Wealth?”, supra note 158 at 16; Alon Brav, Wei 
Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, “Hedge Fund Activism: A Review” (2010) 4 Foundations & Trends 
in Fin 185; Nicole M Boyson & Robert M Mooradian, “Corporate Governance and Hedge 
Fund Activism” (2011) 14 Rev Derivatives Res 169; Christopher P Clifford, “Value Creation 
or Value Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists” (2008) 14 J Corp Fin 323; 
Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg R Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, “Governance Under the Gun: 
Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism” (2019) 23 Rev Fin 1031; Zhu, supra at note 167. 
See also Greenwood & Schor, supra note 166 (finding no change in return of assets for target 
firms that were not acquired).
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improvements were not due to improved business results, but rather the declines 
in the firms’ assets and outstanding shares.170 It may also be the case that this 
improvement in metrics is illusory. The only study that has carefully matched 
targeted firms with control companies showing the same pre-intervention return 
on assets and financial trends as the targets, found “no evidence of post-activism 
changes in ROA [return on assets] for target firms.”171 It also failed to find any 
evidence of improvements in return on equity.172
Similar results arise from looking at other operational metrics. After reviewing 
the evidence, Professors Coffee and Palia conclude, “[l]ittle evidence supports the 
thesis that hedge funds promote growth in sales or asset size.”173 A little later they 
note more generally, it is “highly doubtful that operating performance improves 
as a result of activist interventions.”174 The most recent study on the topic looked 
at “a more comprehensive set of accounting performance measures including…
profit margin, asset turnover, and spread over borrowing costs, but again fail[ed] 
to find consistent evidence of improvements following activist interventions.”175 
This is broadly in line with earlier research that found profitability to be either 
unaffected or negatively impacted by activist campaigns.176 Three recent, good 
quality studies have all found that activism produces no significant improvement 
in business cash flows.177
For their part, investment bank analysts apparently do not expect 
post-activism improvements in corporate earnings, as shown by their earnings 
forecasts.178 The market participants with the greatest level of information about 
target companies simply do not expect to see operational improvements from 
activist campaigns. It appears they are correct.
If a target company’s actual business performance does not improve from 
activist campaigns, does it at least become more valuable to the shareholders, 
possibly by improving efficiencies within the firm? In this regard, there are several 
170. Clifford, supra note 169 at 330-31 (noting “the improvements in operational efficiency 
are caused by a reduction in firm assets, more so than an improvement in cash flow” 
(ibid at 331)).
171. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 5.
172. Ibid.
173. Bratton, “Hedge Funds”, supra note 155 at 591.
174. Ibid at 592.
175. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 5-6.
176. Klein & Zur, supra note 161 at 223.
177. In the literature, “good quality” studies are ones that carefully match the control group with 
the targets of activist shareholders. See e.g. ibid at 201; Clifford, supra note 169 at 330-31; 
Boyson & Mooradian, supra note 169 at 191.
178. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 6, 26.
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difficulties with the empirical literature. Most of the studies focus on the short-term 
share price impact of 13D announcements by American activist investors that 
they have crossed the 5 per cent share ownership threshold. There are at least ten 
studies of this type, which found positive abnormal returns between 3.39 per 
cent and 6.97 per cent in the month of the announcement.179 The problem is that 
stock prices tend to appreciate in response to all 13D announcements, not just 
those filed by activist shareholders. The magnitude of share price appreciation 
in response to an activist hedge fund 13D filing is not materially different from 
the market response following 13D filings by insiders, buy-and-hold financial 
institutions, 10 per cent holders, and others.180 It appears that investors interpret 
a 13D filing as evidence that something new is happening with a company; they 
pile into the stock so they do not miss an opportunity. There is very little basis 
from these short-term studies to conclude that there is anything special about a 
corporate governance-inflected activist announcement.
The second problem is that it is difficult to be confident that any change in 
share price is due to the market anticipating improved corporate governance. 
As indicated above, hedge fund activists primarily target relatively undervalued 
firms.181 A 13D announcement can be understood as a signal that a smart 
investor has found an undervalued asset, rather than as a promise that corporate 
governance is going to be improved now that an activist has come on the scene.182 
Even longer-term studies of the impact of activist shareholder interventions face 
the difficulty of disentangling the reasons for the improvement in firm value.183
179. Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 33 at 1729-75 (noting an average abnormal 
monthly return of 5.10 per cent for 1,059 targetings of 882 unique firms, by 236 different 
hedge fund activists); Klein & Zur, supra note 161 (reporting a 5.7 per cent abnormal return 
during a 36-day period surrounding the filing dates for 134 targeted firms); Christopher 
P Clifford & Laura Lindsey, “Blockholder Heterogeneity, CEO Compensation, and Firm 
Performance” (2016) 51 J Fin & Quantitative Analysis 1491; Marco Becht et al, “Returns 
to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study” (2017) European Corporate Governance 
Institute Finance Working Paper No 402/2014, online (pdf ): <ecgi.global/sites/default/files/
working_papers/documents/ssrn-id23762716_1.pdf> (reporting average abnormal stock 
returns ranging from 3.93 per cent to 6.97 per cent). See also Becht et al, “Returns to Hedge 
Fund Activism”, supra note 162.
180. See Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal & Jan Schnitzler, “What is Special about Hedge Fund Activism: 
Evidence from 13-D Filings” (Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No 14-16, 2014) at 
38, online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2506704>.
181. Cremers, Pareek & Sautner, “Long-Term Value”, supra note 167 at 6.
182. Ibid; Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 141 at 408.
183. Ibid at 419-20.
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Related to this problem is the failure of many studies to use benchmarks or 
suitable control groups.184 As the most recent paper on this topic notes, “prior 
papers that find post-activism improvements in accounting-based operating 
performance either do not use a benchmark control group, or identify a control 
group without taking into account pre-activism performance trends.”185 This is a 
particular problem given that the targets of hedge fund activists exhibit atypical 
market performance in the run-up to the intervention (this is, after all, why 
they are undervalued relative to their peers). Returns to activist campaigns tend 
to be almost exclusively generated by interventions at smaller firms (including 
a significant percentage not even listed on a national stock exchange),186 where 
mispriced stocks are much more likely.187 Firms with market values in excess of 
$40 million (a remarkably low cut-off for public companies) do not appear to 
experience any consistent increase in shareholder value from activist shareholder 
interventions.188
The short-term nature of much of the empirical research is also unhelpful. 
With only a couple of exceptions, the studies measure the impact of hedge 
funds over a period of two years or less.189 This is strange, given that the actual 
debate around activist shareholders is couched in terms of whether the financial 
engineering promoted by them is in the long-term interests of companies. 
Increasing dividends, share buybacks, and corporate sales are self-evidently in the 
short-term interests of the current shareholders, but what happens afterwards?190 
A surprisingly small body of research addresses itself to this—the real—debate.191
Probably the best-known paper on the long-term consequences of hedge 
fund activism is by Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, who 
looked at companies for a suitably lengthy period of time (five years) and found 
value-weighted abnormal stock price returns of 5.81 per cent over that period.192 
184. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 3.
185. Ibid. See e.g. Cremers, Pareek & Sautner, “Long-Term Value”, supra note 167 at 7.
186. Allaire & Dauphin, “Cui Bono?”, supra note 167 at 286.
187. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 9.
188. Ibid at 29.
189. See e.g. Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting Wealth?”, supra note 15 at 158. See also 
Strine, “Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?”, supra note 159 at 1955.
190. See John Kay, “The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making” 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012), online (pdf ): <assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/
bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf>.
191. Strine, “Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?”, supra note 159 at 1966; Denes, Karpoff & 
McWilliams, supra note 142 at 417 (reviewing the then extant research).
192. “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism” (2015) 115 Colum L Rev 1085.
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This is the headline result. Unfortunately, by another measure, the study found 
investors would have received a slightly negative abnormal return over the five 
years.193 There are also serious methodological problems with the study, beginning 
with the fact it starts with 1,584 companies and ends in year five with only 694 
companies, with no attempt to track the companies that are dropped.194 Several 
different teams of scholars have written persuasively about several other major 
flaws in the study.195 But perhaps most interesting is that, even if we accepted the 
paper uncritically, when the returns on assets experienced by the target companies 
are compared with the returns experienced by (inadequately) industry-matched 
control companies, “the positive impact of hedge funds, if that difference 
were really attributable to their intervention, would amount to going from a 
performance infinitesimally smaller than industry performance to a performance 
infinitesimally better than industry performance.”196
Using the same dataset as Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, but more carefully 
matching control firms with the targets of hedge fund activism, a recent paper 
found that “the firm value of the target firms tends to be 5.5% lower than the firm 
value of [the] control firms at the end of the fiscal year in which the activist hedge 
funds start their campaign, and about 9.8% lower…three years thereafter.”197 The 
researchers note that this result is robust across several matching protocols and 
adding different fixed effects.198
This then raises the question: How do the activist hedge funds generate their 
returns if corporate performance declines? Of course, some of it may be related 
to timing the sale of their shares,  extracting control premiums from companies, 
and using leverage.199 Given that the returns tend to be concentrated in the 
smallest target companies, some of the returns may be generated by identifying 
undervalued companies and bringing them to the attention of the market as a 
whole. However, the evidence mostly suggests that the vast majority of the returns 
generated from hedge fund activism arise from those cases where the activist 
193. Ibid at 1126-27.
194. Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting Wealth?”, supra note 158 at 9.
195. Coffee & Palia, supra note 157 at 587; Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting Wealth?”, 
supra note 158 at 9; deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151.
196. Allaire & Dauphin, “Creators of Lasting Wealth?”, supra note 158 at 9.
197. KJ Martijn Cremers et al, “Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value” (January 
2016) University of Notre Dame Working Paper at 4-5, online (pdf ): <ccl.yale.edu/sites/
default/files/files/leo16_Sepe.pdf>.
198. Ibid at 5. See also Allaire & Dauphin, “Cui Bono?”, supra note 167 at 297 (finding no 
impact on performance after three years).
199. Ibid at 296.
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intervention results in a sale of the company. As a recent study put it, “nearly 
all the positive long-term returns to activist interventions are concentrated in 
firms that are subsequently acquired.”200 Activist campaigns are followed by a 
significantly increased frequency of target firm acquisition,201 and a large body of 
research suggests this phenomenon is the primary driver of hedge fund returns.202
3. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN WE DRAW FROM HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM?
There is very little support in the data we have reviewed for the good shareholder 
story. While activists replace CEOs at statistically significant rates,203 there is 
little evidence that the companies targeted by activists differ from their peers 
in the way managers were using free cash flows prior to the activists arriving on 
the scene,204 and no evidence that the returns generated by activist investors are 
connected with reducing these agency costs.205
The data contains considerable evidence for the bad shareholder story, 
however. Activist interventions are short-term, they bear little evidence the 
activist firm understands the business of the target, they typically involve fairly 
routine financial engineering steps to boost share value while not improving 
the business and profits of the company, and while interventions increase share 
price in the short-term, it is unlikely that this is due to market anticipation of 
improved corporate governance. Where the activist succeeds in placing nominees 
on the board, the companies significantly underperform their peers. Finally, 
the evidence suggests that the surviving targets do worse in the long-term than 
carefully matched control firms.
200. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151 at 6.
201. See Nicole M Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev & Anil Shivdasani, “Activism Mergers” (2017) 
126 J Fin Econ 54.
202. deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 151; Greenwood & Schor, supra note 166; Allaire 
& Dauphin, “Cui Bono?”, supra note 167 at 296; Brav et al, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra 
note 33 at 1759; Coffee & Palia, supra note 156 (noting “changes in the expected takeover 
premium, more than operating improvements, account for most of the stock price gain, both 
in short-term and long-term studies” (ibid at 588)).
203. See “Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group: Review of Shareholder Activism — 3Q 2017” 
(2017) at 2, online (pdf ): <www.lazard.com/media/450309/lazard-review-of-shareholder-
activism-q3-2017-final.pdf> (finding that annualised CEO turnover increases from 12 
per cent to 23 per cent for activist targets); Allaire & Dauphin, “Cui Bono?”, supra note 1 
(showing “a large difference” in the rate of CEO turnover between activist targets and the 
control firms (ibid at 289)); Zhu, supra note 167 at 15-17.
204. Coffee & Palia, supra note 156 at 582-83 (reviewing the literature).
205. Ibid at 589.
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C. TAKEOVERS
Of all the forms of shareholder activism, a takeover offer is the most costly. 
The offeror bears the entire burden of the intervention and its long-term 
consequences. The market for corporate control therefore provides the strongest 
potential case for the good shareholder story as, on its face, it appears to consist 
of a shareholder finding value in constraining managerial agency costs by taking 
control of the company.206
The merits of takeovers for the target company’s shareholders seem obvious: 
Acquisitions must always be conducted at a premium to the market. Nevertheless, 
some scholars express concern about two possible problems. First, there is the risk 
that value-decreasing takeovers are possible in circumstances where shareholder 
misinformation occurs.207 This might be the case, for example, with companies 
characterised by non-linear innovation, as the companies’ current performance 
may not be indicative of their future performance. Some long-term investments 
will depress current earnings and the market price may not accurately reflect 
future cash flows.208 Shareholders may also mistake the value of businesses that 
experience significant earnings volatility, or whose market price is impacted 
by macro-economic or industry factors that do not reflect the companies’ 
fundamentals.209 Companies can be “caught” in a general market or industry 
sell-off. As two academics noted about the frequently misunderstood Efficient 
Capital Markets Hypothesis, it “does not imply that the share price equals the 
pro rata value of the discounted free cash flows of the corporation….To say that 
no investment strategy can outperform the market does not…say anything about 
the stock price’s accuracy in measuring the corporation’s fundamental value.”210
206. See e.g. Anita Anand, Fraser Harland & Laurent Lacas, “The Future of Poison Pills in 
Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?” (2015) 61 McGill LJ 1.
207. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, “Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, 
Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers” (1988) 19 
RAND J Econ 516.
208. See Lynn A Stout, “The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance” (2003) 28 J Corp L 635 (summarizing the evidence that short-term share prices 
deviate from their fundamental values for extended periods of time); LeRoy, supra note 43 
(citing evidence of regularly occurring discrepancies between price and fundamental value); 
Louis Lowenstein, “Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm: A Behavioural 
Perspective” (2006) 7 J Behav Fin 66.
209. See Michael L Wachter, “Takeover Defense When Financial Markets are (Only) Relatively 
Efficient” (2003) 151 U Pa L Rev 787.
210. Bratton & Wachter, “Shareholder Empowerment”, supra note 43 at 692.
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The second problem relates to what is referred to as “the bonding 
hypothesis.” This is a theory that “takeover defenses increase the value of 
managers’ commitments to maintain their promised operating strategy and not 
to opportunistically exploit their counterparties’ investments in the…firm.”211 
The firm’s counterparties—customers, lenders, employees, and suppliers—are 
encouraged to invest in the business, increasing its value. However, the increase 
in value comes expressly from the assurance that these investments cannot be 
expropriated by the shareholders through a takeover. So, for example, the authors 
of one study found that takeover defenses are deployed by Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) firms precisely when they have large customers, dependent suppliers, 
or strategic partners.212 The study found that these relationships last longer for 
firms with takeover defenses and these firms appear to get a higher price at the 
time of going public than firms without the defenses.
1. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT TAKEOVERS
Takeovers are very good for the shareholders of the target company. Between 1973 
and 2002, the average acquisition premium was about 50 per cent in the United 
States and 23 per cent in Canada.213 Takeovers are not, however, particularly 
good for the shareholders of the acquiring company.214 A 2008 study found that 
the shares of the bidder experience no bump in price at the time the tender offer 
is announced; the returns on those shares are indistinguishable from those of 
the general market.215 Hostile bids result in worse acquirer stock performance 
211. William C Johnson, Jonathan M Karpoff & Sangho Yi, “The Bonding Hypothesis of 
Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms” (2015) 117 J Fin Econ 307 at 329.
212. Ibid.
213. See B Espen Eckbo, “Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review” (2009) 15 J 
Corp Fin 149. See also Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Strafford, “New Evidence 
and Perspectives on Mergers” (2001) 15 J Econ Persp 103; Gregg A Jarrell, James A Bickley 
& Jeffry M Netter “The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 
1980” (1988) 2 J Econ Persp 49; Michael C Jensen & Richard S Ruback, “The Market for 
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence” (1983) 11 J Fin Econ 5; Tingle, “Fiduciary 
Duty”, supra note 61 at 308.
214. See Bernard S Black, “Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers” (1989) 41 Stan L Rev 597.
215. Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, “A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We 
Learned and Where Do We Stand?” (2008) 32 J Banking & Fin 2148. See also B Espen 
Eckbo & Karin S Thorburn, “Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign 
Acquisitions in Canada” (2000) 35 J Fin & Quantitative Analysis 1 (finding, interestingly, 
that in the period of 1964 to 1983 domestic acquirors generated positive returns and US 
bidders generated negative returns when either group announced the takeover of a Canadian 
company); Walid Ben-Amar & Paul André, “Separation of Ownership from Control and 
Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada” (2006) 33 J Bus 
Fin & Acct 517 (also finding positive announcement returns in Canada, particularly when 
the bidder has a controlling shareholder).
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than friendly deals.216 Possibly connected to this, hostile bids tend to present 
target company shareholders with a higher premium, doubtless, in part, because 
shareholders require an extra inducement to sell against the recommendation of 
the directors.217
Longer term studies on the economics of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
transactions are decidedly negative for acquirers. For example, studies that 
measure operating performance over time (such as earnings or other measures of 
cash flows) largely find that acquirers tend to underperform their peers for the 
next several years.218 Casting considerable doubt on one of the commonly-given 
reasons for an acquisition—that there are synergies between the two companies 
that will lead to lower costs and higher profits—it appears that acquisitions of 
firms in the same industry as the bidder produce no performance advantage over 
acquisitions in an unrelated industry.219
Surveying the evidence, one team of authors observed, “[c]onsensus seems to 
have formed that the value of deals generally flows to shareholders of the target 
firm….[E]xperience shows that the surviving firm often fails to realise economic 
value.”220 Where does the value received by target company shareholders come 
from? At least some of it appears to come from the expropriation of value 
from other corporate constituencies. For example, it can arise from increased 
leverage applied to the target business, either from the addition of more debt, 
the sale of assets, or both. An American study looking at the impact of state 
takeover laws on corporate debt found that bonds in takeover-friendly states 
had significantly higher yields at the time of issue, and that issuers had higher 
total levels of leverage.221 Critics of takeovers argue that the premium received 
by target company shareholders also comes from redeploying target company 
cash from long-term projects, cutting capital expenditures, and reducing labour 
216. See Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, “Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic 
and Cross-border Takeover Bids” (2004) 10 Eur Fin Mgmt 9.
217. Johnson, Karpoff & Yi, supra note 211; Henri Servaes, “Tobin’s Q and the Gains from 
Takeovers” (1991) 46 J Fin 409.
218. Martynova & Renneboog, supra note 216 at 2168.
219. Ibid at 2159.
220. David Larcker & Brian Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational 
Choices and Their Consequences, 2nd ed (Pearson Press, 2015) at 322.
221. Bill B Francis et al, “The Effect of State Antitakeover Laws on the Firm’s Bondholders” 
(2010) 96 J Fin Econ 127.
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costs.222 These are more contentious claims and sorting out the truth of them is 
not important for our purposes.
The question we are interested in is: How much of the takeover premium 
is the result of reducing agency costs? This is the story commonly told about 
takeovers,223 and it would provide powerful support for the good shareholder 
story. The empirical literature suggests several problems with an uncritical 
acceptance of it. First, after studying over two thousand corporations that were 
the targets of takeovers, Anup Agrawal and Jeffrey Jaffe concluded, “[o]verall, 
we do not find much support for the inefficient management hypothesis. Target 
firms as a group do not underperform over a decade-long pre-bid period, whether 
performance is measured by operating returns or stock returns.”224 The one study 
to consider this question specifically in Canada also found that their results 
“contradict the general wisdom that the market for corporate control penalises 
underperforming companies.”225 Takeovers are not, apparently, a response to 
managerial misbehaviour.
Indeed, the usual formula, that takeovers discipline managers, may be 
precisely backwards. Most senior executives have golden parachutes or severance 
clauses that produce major payouts on termination after a change of control.226 
They have options and shares, which market norms prevent them from selling 
while they are employed by the company.227 The takeover premium will produce 
significant wealth for them in their capacity of equity holders as well. Possibly 
the most conclusive evidence that the agency cost explanation for takeovers is 
incorrect is the impact of a takeover on executives’ reputation. Far from being 
222. See e.g. Lynn A Stout, “Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin 
Lipton May Be Right” (2005) 60 Bus Law 1435 at 1441; Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta 
& Rik Sen, “Discipline or Disruption? Stakeholder Relationships and the Effect of 
Takeover Threat” (2016) 62 Mgmt Science 2820 (finding a positive effect of US business 
combination statutes on the performance of firms with important principal customers. 
These firms respond to the imposition of the statutes by reducing their selling, general, and 
administrative expenses as a proportion of sales, suggesting takeovers are expected to result in 
the expropriation of value from customers).
223. See Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73 J Pol 
Econ 110 at 117.
224. “Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns” (2003) 
38 J Fin & Quantitative Analysis 721 at 722.
225. Stefan Luthringshauser & Julinda Nuri, “The Mystery of the Market for Corporate Control: 
Takeover Likelihood of Underperforming Firms” (2012) at 15, online: <www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2126509>.
226. See Jeffrey Marshall, “Looking Hard at Executive Pay” (2006) 22 Fin Executive 36.
227. See Brian J Hall & Kevin J Murphy, “The Trouble with Stock Options” (2003) 17 
J Econ Persp 49.
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generally stigmatised as untrustworthy agents, displaced managers trumpet 
the fact they successfully sold the company at a significant premium for the 
shareholders. The vast majority of takeovers, after all, are not hostile, but 
friendly.228 If we are looking for excessive agency costs in takeovers, they may be 
at least as likely manifested by managers selling the company for personal gain as 
by managers clinging to power to retain their perquisites.
Finally, while there are a few good, modern studies about companies that 
survive as independent firms following an unsolicited takeover offer, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many go on to outperform their peers.229 The one study 
looking at long-term outcomes of successful takeover defenses found that the 
companies outperform their peers by 40 per cent over the five years following 
a successful defense, but only if the target companies increase their leverage.230
2. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE USE OF TAKEOVER DEFENSES?
Most of the research surrounding the market for corporate control has revolved 
around the use and effects of various takeover defenses. From 1980 to 2011, 
almost two thousand articles on antitakeover provisions appeared in peer-reviewed 
academic journals.231 Unfortunately, much of this research is deeply flawed.
Some of the problems are of the garden-variety statistical nature, such as 
reverse causality.232 By far the biggest problem arises, however, from widely held 
misunderstandings about corporate law in the United States (where nearly all 
the research is conducted). A vast amount of the research on takeover defenses 
228. See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 79 (noting that only 1 per cent of public 
companies receive a hostile bid and most of these remain independent or are acquired by a 
friendly bidder).
229. Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “The Value of ‘Just Say No’: A Response to ISS” 
(November 2014), online (pdf ): Institut sur la gouvernance <www.igopp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/IGOPP_Article_Template2014_ValueJustSayNo_EN_v61.pdf> 
(examining four companies: NRG Energy, AirGas, Casey’s, and Illumina); Sabastian V 
Niles, “Shareholder Returns of Hostile Takeover Targets” (24 October 2014), online (blog): 
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance <corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/24/
shareholder-returns-of-hostile-takeover-targets> (looking at Terra Industries); Martin 
Lipton, “Just Say No” (9 December 2014), online (blog): Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governanc <www.corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/12/09/just-say-no> (looking 
at McGraw-Hill).
230. See Assem Safieddine & Sheridan Titman, “Leverage and Corporate Performance: Evidence 
from Unsuccessful Takeovers” (1999) 54 J Fin 547.
231. See Miroslava Straska & H Gregory Waller, “Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder 
Wealth: A Survey of the Literature” (2014) 49 J Fin & Quantitative Analysis 933.
232. See Emiliano M Catan, “The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills” (2018) 
48 J Leg Stud 1.
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focuses on the poison pill, which, in the United States, acts as a complete bar 
to a takeover so as long as the board keeps it in place.233 This research examines 
questions such as changes in firm value or business outcomes following the 
adoption or termination of a poison pill.234 It also looks at the relationship a pill 
has on long-term firm performance, executive compensation, CEO turnover, and 
other features of corporate governance.235 Unfortunately, the presence or absence 
of a pill at any given time does not betray anything about the company, as boards 
can introduce a pill at any time, even in the face of a hostile bid, without seeking 
shareholder approval.236 Corporate directors and their lawyers are very aware of 
this fact, and so the presence or absence of a pill in a company is not indicative 
of how it will react to a takeover, whether the directors feel vulnerable to a hostile 
bid, whether management has too much influence over the board, whether the 
board holds shareholders in esteem or contempt, or whether the company is 
well-governed or abused.237 It tells you nothing, in short, about the company or 
the degree of its exposure to the market for corporate control.238
This point about poison pills has been made repeatedly by several law 
professors since the turn of the century.239 The failure of these warnings to 
impact the work of other members of the legal academy and finance scholars is 
233. See Emiliano M Catan & Marcel Kahan, “The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes” 
(2016) 68 Stan L Rev 629 at 637.
234. See Brent W Ambrose & William L Megginson, “The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership 
Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood” (1992) 27 J Fin 
& Quantitative Analysis 575 (looking at the impact of a pill on the likelihood of a firm being 
acquired); Robert Comment & G William Schwert, “Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the 
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures” (1995) 39 J Fin Econ 3 
(examining whether pills deter bids).
235. See James A Brickley, Jeffrey L Coles & Rory L Terry, “Outside Directors and the Adoption 
of Poison Pills” (1994) 35 J Fin Econ 371; Paul H Malatesta & Ralph A Walkling, “Poison 
Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure” (1988) 20 
J Fin Econ 347.
236. John C Coates, “Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence” (2000) 79 Tex L Rev 271 at 286-87.
237. Ibid at 297-304 (discussing how, even merely viewed as a signal, the adoption of a poison pill 
tells nothing about the company or its expected future).
238. See also Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 79 (one study found, for example, 
that every company targeted by a hostile bid brought in a pill either in advance or after 
the bid was made).
239. Coates, supra note 238 at 297-304; Klausner, “Fact and Fiction”, supra note 66 at 1325-67; 
Michael Klausner, “Empirical Studies of Corporate Law and Governance: Some Steps 
Forward and Some Steps Not” (2018) European Corporate Governance Institute Law 
Working Paper No 381/2018, online (pdf ): <ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/
documents/finalklausner.pdf> [Klausner, “Some Steps Forward”].
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surprising. For example, the very influential scheme for rating “good governance” 
proposed by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick (the “G-Index”), 
or the revised scheme proposed by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen 
Ferrell (the “E-Index”), both include the presence or absence of a poison pill as 
an important part of their metrics.240
Similar problems are created by the mistaken assumption that other takeover 
defenses are effective. Business combination statutes, fair price statutes or charter 
provisions, control share acquisition statutes, and cash-out statutes all have no 
impact on a firm’s exposure to a hostile takeover.241 Nevertheless, all of them are 
present as part of the G-Index.242 Other defenses examined in the literature, such 
as measures making it difficult or impossible for shareholders to call meetings, 
or restrictions on shareholder voting, do not have any impact on companies with 
a staggered board.243 While staggered boards are rare now, they were relatively 
common when much of the research on takeover defenses was conducted.244 
Provisions requiring supermajority shareholder votes to amend corporate charters 
or approve a merger also do not impact the outcome of hostile bids, as any charter 
amendment must also be approved by the board, and a merger vote would only 
occur if the hostile bidder had been materially successful in his bid.245 Golden 
parachutes, which are often assumed by researchers to inhibit takeovers, in fact 
likely encourage them.246 This means, for example, that five of the six elements 
tracked by the E-Index are not useful measures of entrenchment or governance 
240. See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick “Corporate governance and equity prices” 
(2003) 118 QJ Econ 107.; “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices” (2003) 118 QJ Econ 
107; “What Matters in Corporate Governance?” (2009) 22 Rev Fin Stud 783; Tingle, “Can 
We Measure It?”, supra note 9 (a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on the 
validity of these indices).
241. Klausner, “Fact and Fiction”, supra note 66 at 1365; Catan & Kahan, supra note 233 (noting 
that “[c]orporate lawyers and academics generally dismiss these antitakeover statutes as 
irrelevant” (ibid at 632)).
242. See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 240. See also Johnson, Karpoff & Yi, supra note 
211 at 312 (in which other problems with the G-Index are discussed).
243. Klausner, “Some Steps Forward”, supra note 241 at 19, 31-33.
244. See David F Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J Taylor, “The Market Reaction to 
Corporate Governance Regulation” (2011) 101 J Fin Econ 431.
245. See also Coates, supra note 236 at 320-23.
246. See Richard A Lambert & David F Larcker, “Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making 
and Shareholder Wealth” (1985) 7 J Acct Econ 179.
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quality.247 Since being published in 2009, over one thousand studies248 have 
mistakenly used the E-index on the assumption that it offers something useful 
about corporate boards and managers.249
What, in the takeover defense literature, can be used to evaluate the two 
shareholder stories? The largest relevant body of research concerns staggered 
boards. Because poison pills form a complete barrier to a hostile takeover, the 
bidder must always gain control of the target board of directors to remove the 
pill. This takes two years for a US-incorporated firm with a staggered board. 
As a judge of the Delaware Court of Chancery observed in a recent case, “no 
bidder to my knowledge has ever successfully stuck around for two years and 
waged two successful proxy contests to gain control of a classified board in order 
to remove a pill.”250 It is the presence of a staggered board, therefore, not the 
presence of a poison pill, that says something meaningful about a company’s 
exposure to the market for corporate control.
In relation to staggered boards, we see the same pattern in the research that 
we observed in relation to shareholder activism. Nearly all of the initial research 
found that staggered boards were associated with lower firm value,251 and that 
introducing staggered boards was associated with negative abnormal returns.252 
These studies recognised that there could be problems with causality; since most 
governance arrangements are adopted in response to firm-specific circumstances, 
staggered boards could be produced by low firm values rather than (as was 
generally assumed) the other way around.
The early studies on staggered boards had another problem: They used a 
relatively limited time period (1995 to 2002), during which there were very 
247. Klausner, “Some Steps Forward”, supra note 241 at 30.
248. See The President and Fellows of Harvard College, “Links to 1002 Studies that Use the 
Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009)” (October 2020), online: <www.
law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml>; Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”, supra 
note 9 at 223-61.
249. Tingle, “Can We Measure It?”, supra note 9 at 248; Klausner, “Fact and Fiction”, supra 
note 66 at 1363-69.
250. Air Products and Chemicals Inc v Airgas Inc, 16 A.3d 48 at 113 (Del Ch, 2011).
251. See Lucian A Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2005) 83 J Fin 
Econ 501; Olubunmi Faleye, “Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment” 
(2007) 83 J Fin Econ 501; Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 79; Alma Cohen & 
Charles CY Wang, “How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment” (2013) 110 J Fin Econ 627.
252. See James M Mahoney & Joseph T Mahoney, “An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of 
Corporate Charter Antitakeover Amendments on Stockholder Wealth” (1993) 14 Strategic 
Mgmt J 17; Bebchuk, Coates & Subramaniam, supra note 79; Ronald W Masulis, Cong Wei 
& Fei Xie, “Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns” (2007) 62 J Fin 1851.
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few companies either adopting a staggered board or removing one.253 In recent 
years, much larger studies have been performed, capturing the wave of staggered 
boards that arose in the 1980s and the opposite move to de-stagger boards in the 
years following 2005.254 These studies also began looking at differences in firm 
value over several decades, as governance arrangements evolve, rather than simply 
comparing value across firms with different governance arrangements at a single 
point in time.255
These later, better studies find that the results of the earlier studies were the 
result of reverse causality. “[F]irms with lower value are substantially more likely 
to adopt a staggered board.”256 They also found that, when the much larger data 
set of firms is examined, staggered boards are either positively associated with an 
increase in firm value257 or that they produce no material change in firm value.258 
253. See KJ Martijn Cremers, Lubomir Litov & Simone M Sepe, “Staggered Boards and 
Firm Value, Revisited” (2017) 126 J Fin Econ 422 at 425 [Cremers, Litov & Sepe, 
“Staggered Boards”].
254. Ibid. See also KJ Martijn Cremers & Simone M Sepe, “The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards” (2016) 68 Stan L Rev 67 [Cremers & Sepe, “Empowered Boards”].
255. There are also problems in some of the earlier research arising from the incorporation of 
penny stocks traded over the counter or sample sizes that are too small. For a representative 
discussion, see Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Soloman, “Do Staggered Boards 
Affect Firm Value?” (2018) 30 J Applied Corp Fin 61 at 74.
256. Ibid at 5; Cremers, Litov & Sepe, “Staggered Boards”, supra note 254 at 423.
257. Cremers, Litov & Sepe, “Staggered Boards”, supra note 254 at 431, 441 (finding that 
between 1978 and 2015, staggering up (or down) in a given year is associated with an 
increase (or decrease) in Tobin’s Q of approximately 3 per cent in the same fiscal year, of 4.2 
per cent over the next year, and a cumulative increase of 7.4 per cent over the next four fiscal 
years); Cremers & Sepe, “Empowered Boards”, supra note 254 at 103-04 (between 1978 
and 2011, although firms with staggered boards are 2.6 per cent lower than average, when 
industry-fixed effects are replaced by firm-fixed effects, “staggered boards have an average 
overall impact on firm value—resulting from combining the changes…experienced by firms 
that stagger up and by firms that stagger down—that is positive and equal to 3.7%” (ibid at 
103)). Two of the most prominent authors of the earlier research defended this. See Lucian 
A Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, “Recent Board Declassifications: A Response to Cremers and 
Sepe” (2017), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2970629> (Cremers et al, in more recent 
studies, responded convincingly—to this author, at least). See KJ Martijn Cremers & 
Simone M Sepe, “Board Declassification Activism: Why Run Away from the Evidence?” 
(2017), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2991854> (noting “[t]his reply responds to the 
Bebchuk-Cohen critique. Our analysis demonstrates that their critique remains essentially 
silent on the main result [of Cremer’s and Sepe’s research], namely that firm values on 
average significantly declined after…declassifications” (ibid at 3)) [Cremers & Sepe, “Board 
Declassification Activism”].
258. Amihud, supra note 255; NewsRx, “New Law Reviews Study Findings Recently Were 
Reported by Y. Amihud and Co-Researchers (Settling the Staggered Board Debate)” 
Politics & Government Business (7 March 2019) 98 (noting “[t]he effect of a staggered 
board is idiosyncratic; for some firms it increases value, while for other firms it is 
value-destroying” (ibid)).
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More interestingly, later studies found that while staggered boards apparently 
discourage hostile bids, when a hostile takeover is launched, the staggered 
board does not appear to affect the company’s value relative to bid targets 
without a staggered board.259 It is hard to see how this is compatible with the 
usual managerial entrenchment narrative surrounding takeover defenses. “These 
results are not consistent with the notion that classification, on average, facilitates 
self-dealing by incumbent managers at the expense of target shareholders.”260
A possibly more helpful thread in the scholarly literature looks at board 
classification in several exogenous natural experiments in an attempt to disentangle 
the wealth effects of staggered boards from omitted variables, and to reduce the risk 
of getting the direction of causality wrong. In this vein, the Harvard Shareholder 
Rights Project, which targeted companies for declassification between 2011 
and 2014, without regard to other characteristics of the companies and without 
advanced notice to the market, has been found to have caused “economically 
and statistically significant reductions in firm value…both in absolute terms and 
relative to declassifications occurring [at other firms].”261 These wealth effects 
appear to have arisen largely from affected firms with high R&D expenditures.262
Similarly, a law passed in Massachusetts, which imposed a staggered board 
on all firms incorporated in that state, produced significant and positive average 
increases in Tobin’s Q.263 Another study looked at the impact of various recent 
legislative and regulatory events in the United States potentially impacting 
staggered boards, finding that the market reaction in every case suggests staggered 
boards are value-enhancing.264 Finally, “dead hand pills” serve as a kind of proxy 
for staggered boards, since they are a poison pill that can only be removed by the 
259. See Thomas W Bates, David Becher & Michael Lemmon, “Board Classification and 
Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control” (2008) 87 
J Fin Econ 656.
260. Ibid at 669.
261. Cremers & Sepe, “Board Declassification Activism”, supra note 257 at 2. See also KJ Martijn 
Cremers & Simone M Sepe, “Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the 
Shareholder Rights Project” (2017), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2962162>.
262. Ibid at 5-6.
263. See Robert Daines, Shelley Xin Li & Charles CY Wang, “Can Staggered Boards 
Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment” (2018) Harvard 
Business School Working Paper No 16-105, online (pdf ): <www.hbs.edu/faculty/
Publication%20Files/16-105_554d24a7-64bf-4f71-9b51-4d3391971106.pdf>.
264. See Larcker, Ormazabal & Taylor, supra note 244.
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same “continuing” directors that imposed it. The research finds that dead hand 
pills are associated with wealth gains to shareholders.265
Some studies have looked at the impact of staggered boards on things other 
than shareholder wealth. Several of these are relevant to evaluating the two 
shareholder stories. One study found that a staggered board was just as likely to 
terminate a CEO as a board elected annually.266 Another study found that the 
presence of a staggered board had no impact on the amounts paid to executives 
or the pay structures used by the firm.267 A study of American banks found that 
classified boards were roughly 18 to 26 per cent less likely to require state bailouts 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.268
3. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN WE DRAW FROM TAKEOVERS?
Once again, the empirical research around the market for corporate control 
provides little support for the good shareholder story. There does not appear to 
be managerial underperformance in the decade preceding a takeover bid. Targets 
surviving as independent entities following a failed bid tend to outperform the 
market (notwithstanding management and boards remaining intact), and at least 
some—possibly all—of the gains to target company shareholders associated with 
a takeover are the result of the same kind of financial engineering we saw in 
activist campaigns. There is little evidence, in any event, that the premium paid on 
successful bids is generated by operating improvements under new management.
In contrast, there is a great deal of support for the bad shareholder story 
in the empirical literature. The one effective takeover defense in the United 
States, the staggered board, is associated with better firm performance and 
higher shareholder value (or no change to shareholder value), and immunity 
from the market for corporate control seems to have no effect on CEO turnover 
or executive pay. To the extent that there is variation among companies, there 
265. See Katharine Gleason & Mark Klock, “Is There Power Behind the Dead Hand? 
An Empirical Investigation of Dead Hand Poison Pills” (2008) 7 Corp Ownership & 
Control 370. For a summary of dead hand poison pills under Delaware law, see Peter Letsou, 
“Are Dead Hand (And No Hand) Poison Pills Really Dead?” (2000) 68 U Cin L Rev 1101.
266. Cremers, Litov & Sepe, “Staggered Boards”, supra note 253 at 443.
267. See KJ Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M Sepe, “CEO Pay Redux” (2017) 
96 Tex L Rev 205.
268. See Daniel Ferreira et al, “Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts” (2013) 
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is evidence that companies pursuing long-term strategies (measured by R&D 
expenditures) and needing non-financial investments from strategic partners, 
suppliers, or customers, disproportionately benefit from protections against 
shareholder power.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is understandable that market participants, including regulators, have spent 
most of the past several decades convinced of the merits of the good shareholder 
story. It is the dominant narrative in most academic discussions of corporate 
law and finance, and most of the early research on shareholder interventions 
suggested they were value-creating. It has only been in the last decade or so that 
the limitations on that early research have been well-understood: the problems 
with event studies; the importance of carefully matching control firms; the 
mistakes in what actually serves as a takeover defense; and the limitations of 
studies that look at only a few years of data. It is noteworthy that most of the 
longer-term, multi-decade studies have been published only recently.
There is still a great deal of controversy in the literature, of course. The simple 
fact is that all studies of corporate governance have difficulty establishing the 
direction of causality or accounting for potentially omitted variables. That is why 
this article has looked not just at one measure, such as shareholder value, but at 
a range of measures: shareholder value (especially over the long term), operating 
results, CEO turnover, changes to corporate pay practices, and variations in the 
companies targeted. It is also why this article has looked at the three principal 
vectors of shareholder activism, rather than concentrating on just one. While 
reasonable people might disagree on whether staggered boards produce a 
benefit or not (it is clear, however, that they do not diminish corporate value), 
it is more difficult to take issue with the entire uncorrelated corpus of research on 
shareholder proposals, activism, and takeovers.
Taken as a whole, the empirical work performed over the past several decades 
suggests the good shareholder story has limited explanatory power. In general, 
shareholder interventions do not appear to arise from agency failures and they 
are not characterised by remedial actions linked to reigning in executives. 
In contrast, the bad shareholder story is supported again and again in the 
literature. Shareholder power is exercised in favour of strategies that show little 
engagement with the actual business realities experienced by their targets and, 
in the wake of their interventions, companies tend to underperform, especially 
over the long-term.
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The biggest gains from shareholder interventions appear to derive from a 
limited repertoire of financial engineering moves designed to take money from 
retained earnings, increase debt, or sell assets. The money thus liberated is 
transferred to the shareholders via share buybacks, takeover premia, or dividends. 
There is nothing inherently bad about this, and it would take a very different article 
to evaluate whether, on balance, this process—the decline of equity as a source of 
long-term capital—is good or bad for companies and the economy as a whole.269
All that we are concerned about at present is whether the empirical evidence 
supports the good shareholder story: It does not. Regulators and market 
participants should therefore be cautious about automatically associating measures 
that increase shareholder power with improvements in the market. An example 
of the way this caution might play out is provided by the recent Ontario 
Capital Markets Modernization Taskforce’s (“Taskforce”) consultation report.270 
The report provides multiple examples of the usefulness of understanding the 
superiority of the bad shareholder story over the alternative.
In relation to shareholder proposals, for example, the Taskforce recommends 
a streamlined process for dealing with the inclusion of proposals in issuers’ proxy 
materials.271 Given the evidence suggesting shareholder proposals are generally 
value-impairing, it makes sense to improve the efficiency of the process by which 
corporations can receive approval to exclude them from their meetings.
In connection with activist shareholder campaigns, the Taskforce suggests 
that the early warning threshold in Canada be reduced from 10 per cent to 5 per 
cent, to bring the country into conformity with most other jurisdictions in the 
world.272 Whatever the merits of making this change, a side-effect of adopting 
the recommendation will be to reduce the returns to shareholder activism on 
the margins and thus reduce the number of activist campaigns. This seems less 
problematic if the bad shareholder story is generally correct.
Finally, the Taskforce recommends greater powers be given to regulators to 
overturn management tactics designed to influence the outcome of takeovers.273 
Given what we know about the market for corporate control, this recommendation, 
reflecting the traditional Canadian assumption of the good shareholder story, 
269. Fox & Lorsch, supra note 37.
270. Government of Ontario, “Capital Markets Modernization Taskforce: Consultation Report” 
(July 2020), online (pdf ): <files.ontario.ca/books/mof-capital-markets-modernization-
taskforce-report-en-2020-07-09.pdf>.
271. Ibid at 27.
272. Ibid at 25. See also Cheffins, “Hedge Fund Activism”, supra note 103 at 19 (discussing global 
norms in this area).
273. Government of Ontario, supra note 270 at 29.
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seems at least problematic.274 What is it about the impugned managerial actions 
that render them offensive? It can no longer be merely that they interfere with 
shareholder authority or are prima facie instances of self-dealing by managers. 
What is it about the actions in question that impair long term business outcomes? 
The stories, themselves, should not dictate policy conclusions; but starting with 
the right story does get us to ask better quality questions.
The story that we accept about shareholders shifts the burden of proof that 
must be met by proposals for reform. If the bad shareholder story is true, for 
example, then policy changes to increase shareholder power must be supported by 
conclusive evidence in their favour, rather than benefitting from the assumption 
that increasing shareholder influence is usually beneficial. As one group of legal 
academics note in commenting on a proposal by Lucian Bebchuk to further 
expand shareholder power, the old director-centric governance model was not 
obviously flawed. Its performance throughout the twentieth century can only be 
described as a great success.
The adage “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” does not begin to capture the risk of 
Bebchuk’s agenda. One would rather have to say something like “if it has performed 
superlatively over the course of generations, and the visible preferences of the market 
confirm its wisdom, and its continued proper functioning is central to the nation’s 
economy, don’t gratuitously disassemble it.”275
This is a view reflected in surveys of corporate lawyers and directors, who express 
reservations about the trend to ever greater shareholder influence.276 It is even 
visible in the behaviour of shareholders themselves, who shy away from things 
like mandatory bylaw proposals that would bring them additional power, and 
instead focus mainly on optics.277 It is time to seriously reconsider the story that 
we have been using.
274. This assumption is reflected, for example, in Canadian regulators’ refusal to permit poison 
pills to serve as an effective takeover defense for more than a sharply limited period of time.
275. Theodore N Mirvis, Paul K Rowe & William Savitt, “Bebchuk’s ‘Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power’: An Opposition” (2007) Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No 586 
at 1, online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=990057>.
276. See Carol Liao, “A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance” (2014) 37 Dal LJ 559 at 
596-98 (noting “[a]n overwhelming majority of the practitioners did not support the trend 
of greater shareholder control” (ibid at 568)).
277. See Kahan & Rock, “Symbolic Governance”, supra note 145 at 1997-2043. See also Tingle, 
“Expressive Voting”, supra note 3.
